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ABSTRACT 
The agro-food sector is swiftly moving towards an internationally interconnected 
system with a large variety of complex relationships, due to year-round supply, 
product differentiation and developments in information technologies, with the aim 
of enhancing competitiveness. In this context, vertical linking in the agro-food 
business especially, vertical coordination has gained attention. 
A case study approach is used to analyse two fruit supply chains -the table grape 
and citrus fruit chain. The study uses a transaction cost approach to analyse the 
supply chain of the fruit industry in South Africa. Transaction cost analysis (TCA) 
represents one possible approach to understanding and evaluating supply chain 
management and has the potential to be combined in an interdisciplinary setting 
with the insights provided by the marketing, logistics and organisational behaviour 
literatures. 
By means of literature study, constructs are identified that help explain the choices 
made, with regard to governance structures and the sources of competitiveness of 
supply chains. The question of governance structures is addressed in transaction 
cost economics (TCE) where asset specificity is of major importance. The sources 
of competitiveness are addressed both in the literature study and from discussions 
undertaken with key industry representatives. 
The empirical application of the TCE theory helped demonstrate the extent to 
which the exporter has adapted to changes in the global environment. The study 
revealed that for both supply chains, the role-players overcompensate to minimise 
their risk. Hence vertical integration rather than outsourcing takes precedence. 
Bilateral contracting and strategic alliances should be given priority to enhance 
effective communication, commitment and collective decision-making. This growing 
recognition of the competitive advantage that can be gained through improving 
coordination in the supply chain is the starting point for SCM initiatives and, these 
are important signals that in the long run will determine the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the industry. 
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SAMEVATTING 
Die landbou-voedsel sektor is vinnig besig om na 'n internasionale interafhanklike 
stelsel met 'n groat verskeidenheid van ingewikkelde verhoudings te beweeg, as 
gevolg van heel-jaar aanbod, produk differensiasie en ontwikkeling in tegnologie, 
met die doel om meer mededingend te wees. In hierdie konteks geniet vertikale 
skakelinge in die landbou-voedsel bedryf, en veral vertikale koordinasie, baie 
aandag. 
'n Gevalle studie benadering is gevolg om twee vrugte waardekettings te analiseer 
-die tafeldruiwe en sitrus ketting. Die studie maak gebruik van 'n transaksie koste 
benadering om die waardeketting van die Suid-Afrikaanse vrugte bedryf te 
analiseer. Transaksie koste analiese (TKA) verteenwoordig een moontlike 
benadering om waardekettingbestuur te verstaan en te evalueer. Dit het oak die 
potensiaal om gekombineer te word in 'n interdissiplinere omgewing met insigte 
wat deur bemarking, logistiek en organisatoriese gedrags literatuur verskaf word. 
Konstruksies is met behulp van literatuur studies ge"identifiseer wat help om die 
keuses wat gemaak is met betrekking tot bestuurstrukture en die bran van 
mededingendheid van waardekettings. Die kwessie van bestuurstrukture word 
aangespreek deur transaksie koste ekonomie (TKE) waarin bate-spesifiekheid van 
groat belang is. Die bran van mededingendheid is aangespreek deur beide 
literatuur te bestudeer en deur besprekings met sleutel-figure in die bedryf. 
Die empiriese toepassing van die TKE teorie help om die mate waarin die 
uitvoerder aangepas het tot veranderinge in die globale omgewing aan te toon. Die 
studie bewys dat firmas in beide waardekettings oorkompenseer vir transaksie 
koste deur vertikale integrasie in plaas van kontrakte. 
Bilaterale kontrakterings en strategiese vennootskappe moet prioriteit geniet om 
effektiewe kommunikasie, verpligtinge en kollektiewe besluitneming te verbeter. 
Die groeiende erkenning wat gegee word aan mededingende voordeel wat gewen 
kan word deur koordinasie in die waardeketting te verbeter is die begin punt vir 
ketting initiatiewe en, dit is belangrike seine wat die volhoubaarheid en 
mededingendheid van die bedryf in die lang termyn sal bepaal. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the process of globalisation of the world economy progresses, the degree of 
international competition among enterprises increases as well, yet not all industries 
or branches are affected to the same extent by this development. By facilitating 
higher levels of mutual beneficial interaction between consumers and producers, 
factor owners and producers, and between producers, opportunities can be 
derived. These are derived from advantages that arise from "economies of scale, 
the gains of division of labour and increased specialisation, and comparative 
advantage, both natural advantages and acquired and endogenous competitive 
advantages" (Drennan, 2000; 2). These are some of the benefits that can be 
attained through good supply chain management strategies. 
The agro-food sector is swiftly moving towards an internationally interconnected 
system with a large variety of complex relationships, due to year-round supply, 
product differentiation and developments in information technologies, with the aim 
of enhancing competitiveness. In this context, vertical linking in the agro-food 
business, especially vertical coordination has gained attention. In order to achieve 
a higher level of supply reliability, there has been a notable increase in 
coordination between actors in the supply chain. 
This raises the issue of governance choice and several governance structures can 
be observed ranging from spot markets through alliances to full integration. All 
these structures serve the same goal, to improve competitiveness. Transaction 
costs are one of the most important factors that determine the governance 
structures that characterise firms or an industry and the extent to which it is 
competitive in the local or global market. 
The overall purpose of this study is to use a transaction cost approach to analyse 
the supply chain of the fruit industry in South Africa. By means of literature study, 
constructs are identified that help explain the choices made with regard to 
governance structures and the sources of competitiveness of supply chains. The 
1 
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question of governance structures is addressed in transaction cost economics 
(TCE) where asset specificity is of major importance. The sources of 
competitiveness are addressed both in the literature study and from discussions 
undertaken with key industry representatives. 
In the following sections, an overview of the relationship between supply chain and 
transaction costs is reviewed. This is followed by a brief justification of the study 
and the methodology that is adapted . The limitations of the study are also 
highlighted, and the chapter concludes with a summary of the content of 
subsequent chapters. 
1.2 SUPPLY CHAIN AND TRANSACTION COSTS RELATIONSHIPS 
Supply chain management (SCM) is a rapidly evolving area of interest to 
academics and business management practitioners. Aspects of marketing, 
economics, logistics and organisational behaviour are all important for developing 
insights into how and why different SCM arrangements emerge and for 
understanding the consequences of these arrangements for industry efficiency and 
competitiveness (Hobbs, 1996a). 
More than 40 years ago, Forrester (1958; 37) noted "management is on the verge 
of a major breakthrough in understanding how industrial company success 
depends on the interactions between the flows of information, materials, money, 
manpower, and capital equipment". The way these flows affect one another to 
cause change and fluctuation form the basis of anticipating the effects of decisions, 
policies, organisational forms and investment choices (Mentzer et a/, 2001 ). 
Mentzer et a/ (2001) note that over the past decade SCM has risen to prominence. 
The reasons for the popularity of the concepts are manifold. However, several 
specific drivers can be traced to trends in global sourcing, an emphasis on time 
and quality-based competition and their respective contributions to greater 
environmental uncertainty. Spekman et a/ (2001) note that the benefits that accrue 
to firms that effectively manage their supply chain partners range from lower costs 
to higher return on investment. In more tightly woven supply chain relationships, 
innovation is enhanced through joint development opportunities and an ability to 
inculcate skills and capabilities from one's partner. 
2 
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Despite the popularity of the concept of SCM, there remains considerable 
confusion as to its meaning. Mentzer et a/ (2001) accentuate that the alternative 
definitions and the categories they represent suggest that the term presents a 
source of confusion for those involved in researching the phenomena as well as 
those attempting to establish a supply chain approach to management. 
According to Hobbs (1996a), transaction cost analysis (TCA) represents one 
possible approach to understanding and evaluating supply chain management and 
has the potential to be combined in an interdisciplinary setting with the insights 
provided by the marketing, logistics and organisational behaviour literatures. 
Relating to this approach, Wilson (1996: 9) notes that the theory of SCM is 
concerned with the linkages in the chain from primary producer to final consumer 
with the aim of reducing the transaction cost incurred within. lt seeks to break down 
barriers between each of the stages in order to achieve higher levels of service and 
considerable cost savings. 
Transaction costs are simply the costs of carrying out any exchange whether 
between firms in a marketplace or a transfer of resources between stages in a 
vertically integrated firm, when the neoclassical assumption of perfect and costless 
information is relaxed (Hobbs, 1996b ). Transaction cost economics recognizes that 
transactions do not occur in a frictionless economic vacuum thus costs of carrying 
out economic exchanges exist (Coase, 1937). Hobbs (1996a: 17) divides 
transaction costs into three main classifications: 
i. "Information costs - firms and individuals face costs in the search for 
information about products, prices, inputs and buyers or sellers. 
ii. Negotiating costs - arise from the physical act of the transaction, such as 
negotiating and writing contracts (costs in terms of managerial expertise, 
hiring of lawyers, etc), or paying for the services of an intermediary to the 
transaction such as a broker or an auctioneer. 
iii. Monitoring or enforcement costs - arise after an exchange has been 
negotiated. This may involve monitoring the quality of goods from a supplier 
or monitoring the behaviour of a supplier or buyer to ensure that all the pre-
agreed terms of the transaction are met." 
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Four key concepts underpin TCA, namely bounded rationality, opportunism, asset 
specificity, and informational asymmetry. Loader (1997: 25) notes that "in a world 
where individuals are subject to bounded rationality (limited judgement)"- although 
they may intend to make a rational decision, their capacity to evaluate accurately 
all possible decision alternatives is physically limited. Hobbs (1996a) notes that 
bounded rationality poses a problem only in situations of complexity or uncertainty, 
where the ability of people to make a fully rational decision is hindered. Williamson 
(1979) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile." Firms and 
individuals sometimes seek to exploit a situation to their own advantage 
(Williamson, 1979). 
Asset specificity arises when a partner to an exchange has invested resources 
specific to that exchange which have little or no value in an alternative use. 
Drennan (2000) notes that asset specificity is generally regarded as the most 
important of the three attributes, because it creates market imperfections and 
allows asset owners to earn rents. lt can take the form of physical assets related to 
location - an example can be the installation of specialised machinery in a 
production plant that is unique to one market. lt can also be in the form of assets 
dedicated to a particular customer, or tangible assets that cannot be easily 
duplicated. Such investments face the risk that trading partners can behave 
opportunistically and set a lower price for the partner than the agreed one, knowing 
that the partner has limited alternatives. 
Hobbs (1996a) notes that TCA allows for relaxation of the full or perfect 
competition assumption of neoclassical theory and recognises that many business 
exchanges are characterised by incomplete, imperfect or asymmetrical information. 
This refers to a situation where all partners to a transaction face the same but 
incomplete levels of information thus all face the same uncertainty. Opportunistic 
behaviour can occur in two ways - adverse selection and the moral hazard 
problem, terms that will be dealt with in greater depth in the following chapter. 
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1.3 SCOPE, AIM AND ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING THE STUDY 
This study attempts to examine the supply chain of the fruit industry in South 
Africa. The linkages from the farm (growers or producers) through to the export are 
of specific interest. Below is a simplified diagram of the fruit supply chain to the 
point of exit for the destination market. 
Figure 1.1: The Fruit supply chain to the point of exit for the destination 
market 
ut ___ ~ 
··- ; - ~ . . 'I 
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The aim of the study is to use a transaction cost approach to supply chain 
management. lt intends to identify and describe the inefficiencies that exist in the 
fruit industry. The study's goal is to analyse the transaction costs involved and to 
make recommendations on how these costs can be reduced. 
The assumption underlying the study is that inefficiencies in the fruit supply chain 
are a source of transaction costs. The existence of transaction costs reduces the 
net price that sellers receive and increases the net price buyers pay, thereby 
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driving a wedge between the equilibrium prices for the buyer and seller. Wilson 
(1996) notes that there is a growing need to cooperate to reduce these costs and 
to try and alleviate the uncertainty of the market, efficiently producing the desired 
products and achieving higher levels of inter-firm communication. 
In the South African fruit industry, the need to create efficiencies for and enhance 
the competitiveness of the industry has arisen. This has come in the wake of a 
strenuous period after the deregulation of the industry in 1997, which prompted a 
number of initiatives such as the establishment of SA Table Grapes (SAT), the 
Fresh Produce Exporters Forum (FPEF) and the current Fruit logistics 
infrastructure capacity optimisation study, to which this study is aligned. According 
to van Dyk (2003), there is a new vision in the fruit supply chain, namely a shift 
from "competition to co-optition" - a compromise between competition and 
collaboration. Spekman et a/ (1998) note that collaboration has become a popular 
topic as an integral facet of SCM sourcing strategies. Collaborative behaviour 
engages partners in joint planning and processes beyond levels reached in less 
intense trading relationships. Effective supply chain management suggests seeking 
close, long-term working relationships with one or two partners, both suppliers and 
customers, who depend on one another for much of their business. lt also 
suggests developing interactive relationships with partners, who share information 
freely, work together, jointly plan for the future and make their success 
interdependent. Hobbs et a/ (1998) show that an efficiently organised supply chain 
can result in low transaction costs and a highly competitive industry in global 
markets. 
By undertaking this study, it is hoped that the sources of transaction costs within 
the industry's supply chain can be identified and propose measures to curb or 
reduce the transaction costs. This will enhance the competitiveness of the South 
African fruit industry. Specifically, recommendations for the reduction of transaction 
costs in the industry will go a long way in ensuring that the costs and the prices are 
lowered, thus achieving higher margins than previously attained. 
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1.4 SOUTH AFRICAN FRUIT INDUSTRY 
1.4.1 Historical background 
The development of the fruit industry dates back to the beginning of the 19th 
century. Many factors influenced the growth of the industry. Rudimentary packing 
facilities, limited spraying material, primitive spray pumps and the 1933 depression 
restricted the growth of the industry. Exports came to halt upon the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939, and only resumed when the war ended. Before the 
Second Word War, producers exported their own fruit under their own trademark 
but after the war, under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, commodity control 
boards were established to modernise and strengthen farming after the 
depression's adverse effect on many farmers. The Act gave the control boards 
powers to fix prices of their products and to gazette regulations of the overall 
control of the marketing of these products. As a result the fruit boards (Deciduous 
and Citrus Boards) were created in 1939 and given monopoly powers over the 
distribution of farm products (Broens and others, 2000). By the 1946/47 season all 
fruit was exported under a common label with the bulk of the crop being sold in the 
UK (Tregurtha and Vink 2002). 
Tregurtha and Vink (2002) note that real marketing changes came about in the 
early 1970s when control over the domestic marketing of fresh fruit was abolished 
and export marketing power was delegated from the Citrus Board to Outspan 
(1970) and later from the Deciduous Fruit Board to Universal Fruit Trade (Co-
operative) Limited (Unifruco) (1986). The disbandment of the fruit boards occurred 
in 1998 after a new Agricultural Marketing Act had been passed in 1996, which 
brought many uncertainties and an unfamiliar new dispensation. This led to a 
number of new initiatives such as the Fresh Produce Exporters' Forum in 1999 to 
include exporters of all fresh produce commodities (Broens et a/, 2000). 
1.4.2 Value chain structure 
South Africa is generally regarded as a country of extremes in terms of its climate 
and topography. The variability in rainfall, temperature and soil types makes it 
extremely difficult to farm effectively and produce optimum yields of high quality 
(FABI website). However, the climate is ideally suited to fruit production and 
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changes in consumption patterns, particularly in the form of an increasing focus on 
the quality and the value-added aspects of the product have become crucial. In 
addition, there is the increasing power of global retail chains in fruit distribution as a 
consequence of the process of concentration and consolidation that they are 
undertaking. As a result, the citrus fruit market is evolving from a producer driven 
form to a more consumer oriented market (UNCTAD website). 
South Africa's citrus industry, unlike much of the country's manufacturing sector, 
has always been outwardly focused and 'globally integrated'. Exports of citrus to 
the UK started in the first decades of the last century; by the 1960s, South Africa 
was exporting well over half of all southern hemisphere fresh citrus and was ranked 
amongst the top five fresh citrus exporters in the world. By the mid-1990s, the 40 
million cartons of citrus exported to over 60 countries represented one third of the 
total local and export value of South African fresh fruit production (Mather, 2003). 
According to Citrus Southern Africa, South Africa is the third largest exporter of 
citrus, after USA and Spain. South African citrus is grown in eight of the nine 
provinces (Fruit South Africa, 2003). Figure 1.2 below is a map of South Africa 
indicating citrus production areas. 
Figure 1.2: Citrus Production areas in South Africa 
i _ ,..· · ~· ·-{'·· 
~ _,11' NORTHERN •. ~ .AI"M!!Oieiti!J$ productioo / •. r PROVINGif:' \ 
! { T~fWraC!JJ>.. . \ 
r-.. r··~ .......... ___ . ~.:Q~~!~ ~ ! '.. ---...., ' ~...,., .. ....... - I -~ I. J ·---. .. -" . GA~Tfi:NGI/ Nctsp .. ' p ·~ · ~ 19ustenbLJ~r· •P.r.!!_klrla ;,. , ' 
' (. ./'-.., NORTH Jo~na&~:~~9"-. MP.UMALA.N!QA • 
I ,._J (,_ WEST _.J.-....,..':/ (osW.o\ZT• . '"--· f --~·, \. f.AND 
I. "- ·o....:-r ,_.../ '{·--.. . ...:::._.., --~ .. y FREE ,/ 
....._ · ,./'" J STATE ,, .r' KWAZULU-
-.... .. ---.. · _,.,- "v" N•ATAL. I -· ~ -c::;lJ' 
NORTHERN ( . -~Ii<iQTHQ) O 
CAPE ". ~ . ~ 
. ...., . ..-.-, ~ 
/ ' · '-·"'-• ..J ' "~ "" \. > \ ___ ..J ---. : . 
I r-.~ /"·"'T..l EASTERN 
.J ~· ( ~ . -? / .- · CI'.PE 
cim.G.w - · . \ 
WEST ERN f 
.__? 
Source: Mather (2003) adapted from Wits Cartography Unit (2002) 
9 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The industry was established in the early 1800s. However, it was not until 1926, 
with the founding of the South Africa Co-operative Citrus Exchange (SACCE), that 
the industry started realizing its enormous potential on the export market. Changes 
in the domestic regulatory environment have also played an important role in 
reshaping the industry. Between the 1940s and the mid-1990s, citrus exports were 
controlled by a single desk exporter - the South African Cooperative Citrus 
Exchange (SACCE). In 1996, new marketing legislation was passed and despite 
vigorous attempts by the single channel exporter to maintain an export monopoly, 
exports were liberalised and growers were now in a position to choose an 
independent exporter. Given South Africa's position as an important southern 
hemisphere exporter, the industry expected a strong 'private sector response' 
(Bayley, 2000). For growers, the impact of liberalisation since its onset has been 
mixed. Although they can now select an export agent, returns have declined and 
also appear to have become more volatile from season to season. In the third year 
after liberalisation (2000), the fruit export industry as a whole lost an estimated R1 
billion in export earnings and the industry declared itself in crisis. Poor returns were 
blamed on quality, oversupply and the existence of too many inexperienced export 
agents. Since the 2000 season, there have been various attempts to privately 
regulate several specific citrus 'chains'. Despite its longer history of global 
integration, changes in international markets and the domestic regulatory 
environment have had a serious impact on the industry (Mather, 2003). Presently, 
the South African citrus industry is regarded as one of the largest agricultural 
industries in the country in terms of export earnings (FABI website). 
The industry employs about 100 000 people in the production and packaging 
sectors, with a total of over 1 million people dependant on the South African citrus 
industry. Major export markets include Japan, USA, the EU, South Korea and 
Taiwan with new markets established in Thailand, Israel and China (Fruit South 
Africa, 2003). The industry is expected to export more than 60 million cartons of 
citrus worth R2.5 billion in this year (FABI website). 
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b) The Deciduous fruit Industry 
The fruit is classified under three categories, - grapes, pome fruit (apples and 
pears) and stone fruit (apricots, nectarines, peaches and plums). According to the 
DFPT (2002) the grape industry employs 33 000 people while the pome and stone 
fruit industries employ 29 000 (including packers) and 14 400 people respectively. 
A summary of data on employment, number of producers, and area planted is 
shown in figure 1.3 below. 
Figure 1.3: Key statistics for the deciduous fruit industry 
EMPLOYMENT 
FRUIT 
Pome Fruit 
Stone Fruit 
Grapes 
EMPLOYMENT 
24 000 Production 
5 000 Packaging 
14 400 
33 000 
TOTAL AREA PLANTED 
FRUIT HECTARES 
Apples 22454 
Pears 12 912 
Apricots 4 751 
Nectarines 1 379 
Peaches 9 575 
Plums 4962 
Grapes 20643 
Total 76 676 
SOURCE: DFPT TREE CENSUS I SADRIN 
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In terms of total area planted, apples constitute 30%; grapes 27% while nectarines 
have the smallest area constituting only 2% (DFPT, 2002). The industry is export 
driven with major markets in central Europe (40%), UK (35%), Asia and the Far 
East (11 %), the Middle East and Mediterranean (6%) while exports to the USA and 
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Africa contribute 4% each (Fruit South Africa, 2003). Estimates are that it earns 
about US$ 125-million in foreign exchange for the country a year (Sukazi, 2002). 
The deciduous industry structure is comprised of farmers, the different fruit 
associations (namely South African Apple and Pear Producers Association 
(SAAPPA); South African Table Grapes (SAT); South African Stone-fruit Producers 
Association (SASPA)) and the Deciduous Fruit Producers Trust (DFPT) which is 
the umbrella organisation of the deciduous fruit industry. Figure 1.4 below 
summarises the structure of the deciduous fruit industry. 
Figure 1.4: Deciduous fruit structure 
HORTEC (PTY) L TD 
Notes: 
SAAPPA- South African Apples and Pears Producers Association 
SAT- South Africa Table grapes 
SASPA- South Africa Stone-fruit Producers Association 
SAPO- South African Plant Improvement Organisation 
Source: Adapted from Faure (2002; 5) 
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c) The Sub-tropical fruit Industry 
Subtropical fruit types require warm conditions and are sensitive to large 
fluctuations in temperature and to frost. The particular climatic requirements of 
some types of subtropical fruit make the cultivation thereof possible in only certain 
specific areas of the country. The main production areas of subtropical fruit in 
South Africa are parts of the Limpopo, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces. 
Fruit such as granadillas and guavas are also grown in the Western Cape, while 
pineapples are grown in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
Measured in terms of the value of production, the subtropical fruit industry earned 
R761 million in 2001/02, an increase of 6% on the 2000/01 figure of R718 million. 
Table 1.2 below gives a summary of production volumes of subtropical fruit during 
the period between 1997 and 2002. 
Table 1.2: Production of subtropical fruit from 1997/98 to 2001/02 
A..ocados 
Bananas 
Aneapples 
Mangoes 
Papayas 
Granadillas 
Utchis 
Guavas 
57,1 
215,7 
146,5 
41 ,7 
22,4 
0,7 
6,4 
28,6 
79,9 
226,9 
146,8 
50,6 
23,2 
1,1 
7,3 
18,1 
Source: National Department of Agriculture (2002) 
69,5 
200,1 
161 .2 
48,0 
20,3 
1,2 
7,5 
23,9 
57,2 
273,8 
100,8 
58,1 
22,6 
1,4 
4,6 
24,3 
During the season from 1997/98 to 2001/02, an average of 3,7 % per annum 
increase in total production of subtropical fruit can be noted. In the 2001/02 season 
bananas, pineapples and avocados contributed 45, 27 and 9,5% respectively to 
the total production of subtropical fruit. 
During the same period between 1997/98 to 2001/02, total exports of subtropical 
fruit decreased by an average of 1% per annum, while export prices for all 
subtropical fruit increased on average by 7 % per annum. The main subtropical 
fruit type exported is avocados and during 2001/02, exports of avocados 
contributed 50% to the total value of exports of subtropical fruit. Other subtropical 
fruit types exported were mangoes, pineapples and papayas (National Department 
of Agriculture, 2002). Figure 1.5 gives a summary of the export volumes and prices 
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for the period 1997/98 to 2001/02. 
Figure 1.5: Quantity and average price of Subtropical fruit exports for 
1997/98-2001/02 season 
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Source: National Department of Agriculture (2002) 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
The theory of supply chain management is concerned with linkages in the chain 
from the primary producer to the final consumer with the incentive of reducing the 
transaction costs incurred within. This entails breaking down barriers between each 
of the stages so as to achieve higher levels of savings and cost savings. 
In this study, due to the complexity of the fruit industry, a case study approach is 
used to analyse transaction costs in the fruit industry. The study includes multiple 
site visits to the exporter's operating location, thus affording the researcher insight 
into the causal processes involved in a complex environment. Such hands-on 
exploratory case research is recommended by several authors as essential (Ciark 
et a/, 2001) for understanding the complex interactions between procurement and 
distribution. As the study involves an area that is not well understood, case study 
research is often the most useful approach, enabling researchers to develop 
frameworks and models that can later be tested and validated (or refuted) using 
more quantitative research methodologies (Ciark et a/, 2001 ). 
lt is important to note that the case study approach involves a single exporter 
dealing with multiple producers and importers, and all the information gathered in 
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this study is from the perspective of Colors Fruit (SA) Pty Ltd, which is a private 
exporting firm. The approach bases on how activities are handled in this particular 
firm. This study deliberately focuses on the producer/ exporter and exporter/ 
importer interfaces with special focus on the exporter's role with the producers and 
importers. 
Two key fruit supply chains form the focus of the analysis, namely, the table grape 
chain and the citrus chain. The rationale behind the choice is the high value and 
large volume attributes for the respective supply chains. 
A consultation with industry representatives is undertaken to: 
i. Map the supply chain for two fruit chains 
ii. Identify linkages in the chain 
iii. Identify inefficiencies 
iv. Identify transaction costs resulting from the inefficiencies 
Analysis of the transaction costs is done and parties are asked for possible 
solutions. The solutions are tested with an expert panel comprising of experts from 
different sectors related to the industry to determine which solutions are realistic. 
1.5.1 Mapping the supply chains 
The mapping activity helps identify links in the chain where exchanges are made. 
These linkages are where inefficiencies and hence transaction costs are incurred. 
The map also shows, graphically, where an organization's time and efforts would 
be best spent. lt also enables identifying the appropriate linkage between a 
supplier and its customers for maximum benefit, including internal supply matter 
relationships throughout the organization (Roberts, 2003) 
1.5.2 Identifying linkages 
Linkages in the chain show the activities and roles played by the different 
participants in the supply chain. For organisations to realise a profit margin 
depends on their ability to manage the linkages between all activities in the value 
chain (Recklies, 2001 ). The motivation for supply chain optimization is sustainable 
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competitive advantage for all players in the value chain gained through lower costs 
and/ or greater differentiation. Upstream links are largely dependent for their 
survival on the competitive position of firms or links satisfying the ultimate end-
user. Similarly, the competitive position of downstream firms is largely dependent 
upon their supplier's costs and actions. Recklies (2001) notes that these linkages 
are crucial for corporate success. The linkages are flows of information, goods and 
services, as well as systems and processes for adjusting activities. The relevance 
of linkages in transaction cost analysis emanates from the fact that it is between 
these interfaces or linkages where transaction costs are incurred. In most 
industries, it is rather unusual that a single company performs all activities from 
product design, production of components, and final assembly to delivery to the 
final user by itself. Most often, organizations are elements of a value system or 
supply chain. Hence, there are a lot of exchanges that occur between production 
and delivery to final end user and as such transaction cost minimisation becomes 
crucial if the objectives of profit maximisation and competitiveness are to be 
attained. 
1.5.3 Identifying inefficiencies 
For the purpose of comparative institutional choice, instead of assuming the pre-
existence of the market, the need to identify inefficiencies in a supply chain 
becomes important. According to Coase (1937; 394) a question that can be raised 
is "Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?" In answering this question, 
transaction cost (TC) theory puts forward two main factors that limit a firm's 
expansion. The first factor is that bounded rationality gives rise to finite spans of 
control, and expansion requires that additional hierarchical layers be added 
(Williamson 1975). This complicates internal communications and may lead to top-
down control losses. On the other hand, the second factor concerns the question of 
'who guards the guardians' (Tsang, 2000). That is, who monitors those in positions 
of authority to ensure that their self-interest does not endanger the collective 
interests of the firm? Tsang (2000) notes that increasing firm size leads to taller 
hierarchies which in turn result in a greater distance of most subordinates from 
their ultimate superiors, and hence less information about the opportunist 
behaviour of senior management. Moreover, stockholders' control over 
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management becomes more difficult when a firm grows in size and complexity 
(Williamson 1975). All these inefficiencies imply that transacting through markets 
would gradually take over. Therefore, the need to identify inefficiencies in this study 
will allow for the identification of transaction costs associated with a particular 
institutional choice or governance mode, thus enabling the identification of an 
efficient institutional choice or governance mode. 
1.5.4 Identifying transaction costs 
A large amount of effort often goes into choosing, orgamzmg, negotiating and 
entering into even the most mundane contracts. The costs associated with these 
efforts (called transaction costs) are generally independent of the price of the 
contracted product or service itself. The conjecture underlying this study is that 
inefficiencies within a chain result in transaction costs which manifest in 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, opportunism, asset specificity and risk in 
conducting an exchange or business. Against this background, the aim is to 
identify inefficiencies that result in transaction costs taking into consideration that 
not all inefficiencies ultimately lead to transaction costs. 
1.6 LIMITATIONS 
The major problem with transaction cost analysis is that the successful 
measurement of transaction costs is neither easy to separate from other 
managerial costs, nor readily measurable. Although one may realise the existence 
of inefficiencies (that induce transaction costs) in the supply chain, it is difficult to 
measure these costs in financial terms. Another limitation stems from the case 
study approach involved. This approach faces data limitations and in addition it has 
been criticised because the results are not necessarily representative of the wider 
economic environment (Hobbs, 1996a). 
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1.7 SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS 
In Chapter Two, the theoretical framework for the analysis and application of 
economic theory to the concept of transaction costs in the fruit supply chain is 
reviewed. Theory from the new institutional economics, especially transaction cost 
economics, will be used to explain how the transaction cost approach to supply 
chain management can be used to enhance the competitiveness of the fruit 
industry in South Africa. Against this background, the case studies of table grape 
and citrus fruit chains are analysed in Chapter Three while Chapter Four concludes 
the study with emphasis on incentives, penalties and safeguard measures to 
minimise transaction costs. Recommendations are also discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study is about identifying and analyzing transaction costs in the supply chain 
of the fruit industry in South Africa. lt endeavours to determine how inefficiencies in 
the supply chain which result in transaction costs can be reduced in order to 
enhance the competitiveness of the South African fruit industry. In this chapter the 
theoretical foundations of the transaction cost economics paradigm, with a brief 
overview of branches of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and institutions is 
reviewed. The concept of transaction cost economics which is the centre of the 
study is also examined. This is followed by an overview of transaction costs and 
their importance to supply chain management in the fruit industry. The governance 
structures that characterize the industry, alternative governance structures and 
efficient governance mechanisms are also reviewed. The chapter ends with a 
review of studies that have been conducted globally and within the region. 
2.2 FOUNDATIONS OF THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
PARADIGM 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a branch of the New Institutional Economics 
(NI E) which is a large and relatively new multidisciplinary field that includes aspects 
of economics, history, sociology, political science, business organisations and law 
(Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). Thus, the NIE represents an "expanded economics" 
that focuses on the choices people make, while at the same time it allows for 
factors such as pervasiveness of information and human limitations on the 
processing of information, evolution of norms, and willingness of people to form 
bonds of trust (Ciague, 1997 cited by Makhura, 2000; 26). At the core of this 
paradigm are transactions and their related costs that constitute the force that 
unifies the sub-fields that have developed (Menard, 2001 ). According to Loader 
and Hobbs (1996), this suggests that an economic system (or sub-system, chain or 
19 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
filiere1) is constituted by a series of transactions, and that the economic actors aim 
to effect those transactions as efficiently as possible. Thus, the approach is firmly 
rooted in the microeconomics of exchange, concentrating on the implications of 
individual transactions for the organisation of a system. 
Makhura (2000) notes that the NIE has moved to the centre stage of economics 
during the last two decades and just as TCE, Ronald Coase is known to have 
pioneered the NIE paradigm with his famous 1937 article "The Nature of the firm" 
while Oliver Williamson coined the phrase, the "New Institutional Economics". 
Coase (2000) notes that the phrase was intended to differentiate the subject from 
the old institutional economics, pioneered (Paarlberg, 1993) by Commons and 
Veblen. The old institutional paradigm argued that institutions were a key factor in 
explaining and influencing economic behaviour but there was little analytical rigor 
and no theory in this school of thought. lt operated outside neo-classical 
economics and there was no quantitative theory from which reliable generalisations 
could be derived or sound policy choices could be made (Makhura, 2000). 
According to Williamson (2000), the NIE had its origins in good critics of orthodoxy 
who believed that institutions were both important and susceptible to analysis. Key 
proponents in the development of this paradigm include six Nobel Laureates -
Kenneth Arrow, Friedrich Hayek, Gunnar Myrdal, Herbert Simon, Ronald Coase 
and Douglass North. Other influential figures - Armen Alchian, Chester Barnard, 
Richard Cyert and James March add to the long list. 
Williamson (1996), notes that the NIE offers not one, but several (related) 
perspectives, operating at two levels - macro and micro. At the macro-perspective 
is the institutional environment that is concerned with the political and legal rules of 
the game while the institutions of governance (arrangements), which is more a 
micro-perspective deals with firm and market modes of contract and organisation. 
According to Makhura (2000), the purpose of the NIE is both to explain the 
operations of institutions and their evolution over time, and to evaluate their 
determinant impact on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution. 
Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) note that this new paradigm of economics considers 
1 The term filiere is derived from the work of francophone economists on food systems and refers 
(as do the other terms) largely to vertical value adding systems (Loader and Hobbs, 1996; 26) 
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that the cost of transacting - determined by institutions and institutional 
arrangements (governance) is the key to economic performance. Makhura (2000) 
notes that there is a two-way causality between institutions and economic growth -
on the one hand, institutions have a profound influence on economic growth, and 
on the other hand, economic growth and development often result in institutional 
change. The usefulness of NIE arises from its ability to deal with whatever forces 
exist in contrast to mainstream economics that focus on a select few while others 
are held constant. lt becomes increasingly useful, according to Paarlberg (1993) 
with more rapid institutional change - a characteristic of modern times. He notes 
that (p826) "it can deal with expectation and attitudinal changes on the part of 
public, forces resulting from the drive for full employment, regulatory activity, 
international quotas, exchange controls, the shift from hard to soft money, the rise 
of special interests, the growth of government, and the advent of endemic 
inflation". However, it must be noted that not all institutional changes are beneficial 
(Makhura, 2000). By influencing transaction costs and coordination possibilities, 
institutions can either facilitate or retard economic growth, which explains why for 
example countries have different paths of economic development. 
2.2.1 Branches of the New Institutional Economics 
As mentioned earlier, NIE is by definition a multi-disciplinary field of study and 
since it is relatively new, there is (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002) still some debate as 
to what falls under the NIE banner but there seems to be some agreement that the 
study fields depicted in figure 2.1 below are part of the NIE. Nabli and Nugent 
(1989; 1333) note that the pioneering contributions that constitute the NIE are 
noteworthy on several grounds: -
i. "The institutions and their determinants that are the subject matter of NIE 
have long served as battle grounds among alternative leading paradigms, 
namely Marxian, neo-classical, and socio-biological. 
ii. NIE represents the culminating intersection of a number of different lines of 
investigation, each interesting in its own right, including the analysis of 
behavioural norms, the integration of persons with different tastes and 
preferences into voting coalitions, interest group formation, the problems of 
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the prerequisites for (successful) collective action, transaction costs, 
organisation theory, limitations on the rationality of human behaviour, the 
emergence of rules of thumb for the firm decision making, the determinants 
of firm structure, coordination problems, rent seeking behaviour, 
technological change and its relationship to institutional change and the 
determinants and effects of property rights. 
iii. Many of these individual lines of investigation within the NIE are 
interdisciplinary, allowing for cross-fertilisation and mutual simulation among 
historians, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, lawyers, and 
economists". 
22 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 2.1: Branches of the New Institutional Economics 
New economic History 
New 
Institutional 
Economics 
,---
-
t--
t--
I--
-
(North, Fogel, Rutherfold) 
Public choice and Political Economy 
(Buchanan, Tullock, Olson, Bates) 
New Social Economics 
(Seeker) 
Transaction Cost Economics 
(Coase, North, Williamson) 
Theory of Collective Action 
(Ostrom , Olson, Hardin) 
Law and Economics 
(Posner) 
Social Capital 
(Putnam, Coleman) 
Property rights literature 
\
r----(A-1-ch-i-an_._D_e_m_s_e_tz-)-----, 
Economics of Information 
(Akerlof, Stigler, Stiglitz) 
(Source; Kherallah and Kirstern, 2002; 115). 
The focus of this chapter is on the transaction cost economics branch, and to put 
transaction costs in their proper context, a brief definition of institutions is crucial. 
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2.2.2 Institutions 
The consensus on the centrality of institutions to development has not been 
matched by one on its definitions. According to Nabli and Nugent (1989); different 
authors have used quite different definitions, each emphasizing different aspects or 
characteristics of the more general phenomenon. Among the characteristics or 
aspects of institutions that vary are the degree to which they are (Nabli and 
Nu gent, 1989; 1334 ): -
i. "organisational, that is, the extent to which organisations and institutions 
coincide, 
ii. formal, 
iii. created at a specific time and place by a specific means, as opposed to 
having evolved from more diffuse sources, 
iv. embedded in, as opposed to differentiated from, other institutions, 
v. universal, as opposed to particularistic, in the interests they serve, 
vi. creating, as opposed to simply maintaining, a certain public good, and 
vii. technology linked". 
Despite the differences and numerous definitions, a number of characteristics can 
be identified that are useful for this study. As Langlois (1986; 17) puts it, citing 
Andrew Schotter, "a social institution is a regularity in social behaviour that is 
agreed to by all members of society, specifies behaviour in specific recurrent 
situations, and is either self-policed or policed by some external authority". 
According to North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game that prohibit, 
permit or require certain actions. North (1990) notes that they comprise 
arrangements among economic agents (laws, rules and customs) that attempt to 
decrease uncertainty and costs in exchange and ownership. Hence they limit and 
define the choice set of neo-classical theory (North, 1989). According to Ortmann 
(2000), institutions arise in a world of uncertainty, costly information and 
transaction costs. 
Ortmann (2000) notes that good institutions promote market exchange by securing 
property rights and predictable rules of law. Good governance relates to 
government policies and institutions that promote competitive markets and 
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efficiency by defining the rules of the game that allow transaction costs to be 
reduced and so enlarge the effective flow of goods and services. In the absence of 
the rule of law, transaction costs and uncertainty increase. North (1989) elaborates 
by noting that the function of institutions is to provide certainty in human 
interaction, and the inherent features of rules and norms accomplish this. The rules 
are typically nested in a hierarchical structure, each more costly to change. He 
further explains that the "norms of behaviour" are the most important sources of 
stability in human interaction due to their tenacious survival ability and because 
they become an integral part of habitual behaviour. In consequence the reduction 
of uncertainty makes possible human interaction, but does not imply that the 
institutions are efficient. 
According to North (1990) institutions can either be formal or informal. Formal 
institutions consist of laws and regulations (e.g. property rights and contractual law) 
while conventions and codes of behaviour (e.g. community norms) fall under 
informal institutions. 
Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) try to distinguish institutions from organisations, 
noting that organisations are a structure of roles and that many institutions are 
organisations (for instance households, firms and cooperatives) while other types 
of institutions such as money or the law are not. 
The origin of institutions is explained by Aoki (2000) citing North's sharp distinction 
between the rules of the game and the players of the game (organisations and 
their political entrepreneurs) who can act as agents of institutional change, that is, 
as rule makers. Aoki (2000) notes that the existing rules of the game shape the 
incentives of players (organisations) as to how to transact and what to innovate, 
ultimately generating an effective demand for new rules in response to changing 
conditions. The new rules will then be negotiated and determined in the political 
market that is structured according to political rules. North (1995) notes that it is the 
polity that defines and enforces the economic rules of the game. Informal norms of 
behaviour come from socially transmitted information and thus constitute a part of 
the cultural heritage. 
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2.2.3 The concept of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
According to Kherallah and Kirsten (2002), the general hypothesis of this strand of 
the NIE is that institutions are transaction cost minimising arrangements that may 
change and evolve with changes in the nature and sources of transaction costs. As 
noted earlier, Ronald Coase first came up with an explanation for the fact that firms 
and markets are alternative governance structures that differ with respect to 
transaction costs. In his original proposition, the cost of organising an exchange in 
a market surpasses the cost of coordinating the exchange in a firm under certain 
conditions. Williamson (1975) added considerable precision to Coase's argument 
by identifying the types of exchanges better conducted within the boundaries of a 
firm than within a market. He argues that economic actors will attempt to organise 
their overall business such that the costs of undertaking exchange with other 
system members (or transaction costs) are minimised. 
Williamson (1996; 25) describes transaction cost economics as "relentlessly 
comparative", (i.e. organisation forms are always examined in relation to alternative 
feasible forms), "micro-analytic" (action resides in details) "discrete structural" 
(alternative forms of governance differ in kind, and so it is impossible to replicate 
markets by hierarchies or the reverse), and preoccupied with economising, 
principally with reference to organisation rather than technology. TCE's distinctive 
ori~ntation is its focus on reducing costs through ex ante selection of governance 
mechanisms appropriate for the antecedent conditions (Williamson, 1985). The 
level of analysis in Williamson's TCE theory is the transaction or contract2. 
Williamson (1985) identifies three attributes of transactions that have cost 
implications, namely the asset specificity associated with the transaction, 
uncertainty surrounding its execution and its frequency. Table 2.1 splits transaction 
costs into six categories and identifies the sources of such costs and clearly 
illustrates the hidden nature of such costs, but also highlights how important they 
may be in terms of time and effort to monitor and screen contracting situations. 
2 When two or more parties agree to exchange or transfer goods or services, the transaction can be 
seen as a form of contract. Costs associated with that transaction include the costs of setting up the 
agreement or contract, then monitoring and if necessary enforcing its performance. Moreover, 
Williamson (1975) suggested that transaction costs include not only the direct expenses of the 
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Table 2.1: Transaction cost sources and tangible forms 
Type of cost 
Search costs 
Screening costs 
Bargaining costs 
Transfer costs 
Monitoring costs 
Enforcement costs 
Source/ origin of costs 
Lack of knowledge about 
opportunities (e.g. products, 
prices, demand, supply trading 
rights, market outlets) 
Uncertainty about reliability of 
the potential suppliers/ buyers; 
uncertainty about the actual 
quality of the goods/ services 
offered 
Conflicting objectives and 
interests of transacting parties; 
uncertainty about the 
willingness of others to trade on 
certain terms; uncertainty over 
transactor rights and obligations 
Legal, extra-legal or physical 
constraints on the movement I 
transfer of goods 
Uncertainty about transactor 
compliance with specified 
terms; uncertainty about 
possible changes in the quality 
of goods and services 
Uncertainty about the level of 
Tangible forms of transaction 
cost 
Personal/ personnel time, travel 
expenses; communication 
costs; advertising/ promotion 
costs; 
Consulting/ service fees; costs 
of credit rating checks 
Licensing fees; insurance 
premiums 
Handling/ storage costs; 
transport costs; bribery and 
corruption expenses 
Auditing fees; product 
inspection charges; investments 
in measurement devices 
Arbitration, legal court fees, 
damages/ injury to a transacting costs to bring social pressure 
party arising from contractual 
non-compliance; problems in 
exacting penalties through 
bilateral agreements or through 
use of third parties 
(Source: Loader and Hobbs, 1996; 27) 
transaction, but also the possible opportunity costs of inferior decisions. 
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In contrast to the orthodoxy "firm-as-production function approach" that treats 
technology (economies of scale, non-seperabilities) as the main determinants of 
the natural boundaries of the firm, TCE approaches the firm and market 
organisation from an efficient contracting or comparative organisational perspective 
(Williamson, 1996). TCE adopts the proposal made by John R Commons in 1934 
that the transaction be made the unit of analysis and moves the argument forward 
by asking what the critical dimensions are on which transactions differ. Ortmann 
(2000) notes that transaction costs vary by product and or type of agent in the 
marketing chain. According to Coase (1937), firms emerge to economise on the 
transaction costs of market exchange and the "boundary" of a firm or the extent of 
vertical integration will depend on the magnitude of those transaction costs. 
Whether a firm makes or buys, that is, produces for its own needs or procures a 
good or service from an outside supplier (i.e. in the market), depends largely on the 
transaction costs of managing the transaction in the firm as compared with 
mediating the transaction through the market. Which transactions go where 
depend on the attributes of transaction, on the one hand, and the costs and 
competence of alternative modes of governance on the other. 
Menard (2000) notes that this approach provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding the trade-off that continuously occurs at the microeconomic level 
between alternative modes of organising transactions and also offers tools for 
analysing interactions between these organisational forms (or governance 
mechanisms in Williamson's terminology) and the institutional environment in which 
they are embedded. In the work of Williamson (1985) on the economics of 
organisation and contracts, the concepts of bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour (which manifests itself as adverse selection, moral hazard, cheating, 
shirking and other forms of strategic behaviour) are used to explain contractual 
choice and the ownership structure of firms. According to Williamson, a trade-off 
between integrated forms of economic organisation and more decentralised 
structures depends on the magnitude of transaction costs. 
Three modes of governance or governance structures through which the trade-off 
is carried out simultaneously or sequentially have been identified in the governance 
branch of TCE. Rousset (2003) notes that the virtue of integrated forms of 
economic organization (the "hierarchies" in Williamson's terminology) is to reduce 
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the costs of hold up in situations of asset specificity and high uncertainty requiring 
medium-term adjustments, lower the "costs of change" (Langlois, 1991) in 
innovating organisations, as well as the costs due to informational asymmetry 
between actors and the problem of measurement of the characteristics of the 
goods that are traded. On the other hand, according to Williamson (1975), the 
advantage of markets is that they allow economies on the costs of bureaucracy 
and control, and that they ease transmission of price incentives. Beyond these 
advantages, markets also have the virtue that they aggregate demand, 
mechanically lowering production costs (Rousset, 2003). The rational entrepreneur 
uses the market when the assets implied in the transaction are generic or slightly 
specific and it constitutes the most effective governance structure (least expensive) 
in such situations. Between the two polar forms, the hybrid form combines these 
properties with a variable intensity. lt corresponds to situations in which the degree 
of specificity is medium - it is high enough to trigger a bilateral dependence that 
requires coordination and mutual control, but it is not high enough to justify a 
centralized integrated organization, the cost transactions of which might take over 
the gains in transaction costs made possible by the organisation. In Table 2.2 
below the comparative advantages of the governance structures based on the 
transaction cost economics framework (Ghertman, 1994; Barzel, 1982; Langlois, 
1992); Williamson, 1991) adapted by Rousset (2003) are presented. 
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Table 2.2: Comparative advantages of the three canonical governance 
structures 
Governance 
Structures Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
(spot) 
Characteristics 
Ghertman *Behavioural Attributes 
(1994) 
*Asset specificity 
*Instruments of management 
Barzel Measurement costs~ (?) 
(1982) 
Langlois Dynamic transaction costs'~ Could be (?) Low 
(1992) prohibitive 
Williamson Intensity of incentives Strong Semi-strong weak 
(1991) 
Low transaction cost (-0); mtermed1ate transaction costs; h1gh transaction costs 
(Source: adapted from Rousset, 2003; 6) 
The conceptual framework is useful to conjecture and understand a firm's choices 
and identify what kind of transactions command vertical integration, stable 
relationships with suppliers or the use of the market 
3 Focuses on the problems linked to the cost of measuring the characteristics of transactions - a 
cost that can make standard trade inefficient. See also Kenney and Klein (1983). 
4 These constitute a type of costs that are linked with asset idiosyncrasy- where both parties to the 
transaction are mutually dependent, for example in a situation of missing markets or in the case of 
technical paradigm change. See example of Ford Motor and the automobile industry in Langlois 
(1992}. 
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2.3 TRANSACTION COSTS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE 
FRUIT INDUSTRY 
The great variety of fruit, the geographical dispersion of production and the high 
perishability inherent to fruits makes this specific trade one of the most complex 
among agricultural products (Carvalho et a/, 2000). To deal with such complexity, 
producers and traders of fruit have empirically adopted several different managerial 
practices. The relevance of this section is to illustrate how supply chain 
management can help to shape the contours of transactions in a specific sector. 
The fruit industry can be classified under the agro-food sector, which represents an 
exceptional domain that presents a great variety of modes of organisation and of 
contractual arrangements accompanying these modes. The approach that is 
developed in this section as mentioned previous section follows the transaction 
costs economics framework developed in the direction opened by Cease, North, 
Williamson, with additions by Langlois and Barzel. This approach provides a 
theoretical framework for understanding the trade-off that continuously occurs at 
the microeconomic level between alternative modes for organising transactions, for 
example, between making a product or a service within an integrated firm and 
choosing to have it provided through markets. In subsections to follow, this 
framework is applied to the agro-food sector under which the fruit industry falls. 
2.3.1 Characteristics of the governance structures in the fruit industry 
Carvalho et a/ (2000; 4 78 citing Coase) pointed out that "operation of markets 
costs something and forming an organisation and by allowing some authority (an 
entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved". If 
successful, the organization(s) tend to grow, resulting in more transactions to be 
coordinated, and, as the firm grows its size will be limited mainly by competition 
with other firms, competition with other forms of transactions and by its own 
capacity to manage the bigger volume of transactions. Cease (1937) notes that all 
changes that result in improved managerial techniques will tend to increase the 
size of the firm, thus emphasising the important role of management. As 
transaction costs of using the open (spot) market system rise, there is a tendency 
towards closer vertical coordination, that is, more transactions are carried out 
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under the auspices of a strategic alliance, through contracting or within a vertically 
integrated firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979; Hobbs and Young, 2000). 
According to Wilson (1996), the slow growth of the perishables industry is causing 
producers and traders to seek product flow that create greater efficiencies and 
economies as a means of increasing their margins. Partnerships and joint 
ventures, with open shared information and communication, have been seen as 
the new form of competition. Cooperative business competes with supply chain 
versus supply chain, with players along the line working together. Companies 
strategically position themselves relative to others to maximize the benefits that 
collective power can bring. 
This becomes critical in the internationalisation of fresh fruit produce, which 
requires a greater degree of coordination. The value of fresh fruit on the open 
market depends on availability (quantity, quality and or timing) and the costs of 
production (Hobbs and Young, 2000; Wilson, 1996). As such, open market 
procurement may not sufficiently guard the firm against risk or other exploitation 
and thus leads to contractual or integrated procurement as an alternative since 
perishability is a significant factor for commodities. As Wilson (1996) puts it, 
contractual or integrated arrangements are more common in perishable 
commodities than storable commodities, thus a low level of uncertainty lends itself 
to the spot market transactions, and, as uncertainty increases and goods become 
more asset specific, movement along the vertical coordination spectrum towards 
vertical integration is experienced. 
Hobbs and Young (2000) constructed a generic model (Table 2.2) of the forces 
behind closer vertical coordination in agro-food supply chains. In this model they 
argue that changes in transaction characteristics alter transaction costs, thereby 
influencing vertical coordination. The model represented in Table 2.3 depicts the 
relationships between generic product features and transaction characteristics, all 
other factors held constant while uncertainty is broken down into four components. 
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Table 2.3: Generic model of the relationship between product characteristics, 
drivers and transaction characteristics 
Product 
characteristic 
Perishability 
Product 
differentiation 
Quality variable 
and visible 
Quality variable 
and invisible 
New 
Characteristics 
of importance to 
consumers 
Regulatory 
drivers 
Liability 
Traceability 
Technology 
Drivers 
Company-
specific 
technology 
Uncertainty 
for buyer: 
quality 
Transaction characteristics 
Uncertainty 
for buyer: 
reliable 
supply Uncertainty Uncertainty 
(timeliness for buyer for seller: 
and and seller: finding a 
quantity) price buyer 
Sometimes 
(Source: adapted from Hobbs and Young, 2000; 133) 
Frequency 
of 
transaction 
Relationship 
specific 
investment 
Sometimes 
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Complexity of 
transaction 
(variety of 
outcomes) 
Sometimes 
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Table 2.3 suggests that the product characteristics listed affect the characteristics 
of the transaction, thereby influencing the vertical coordination outcome. Hobbs 
and Young (2000) give an example of product perishability, implying that it creates 
uncertainty for the buyer with respect to product quality and the reliability (quantity) 
of supply, and creates uncertainty for the seller in locating a buyer since perishable 
products must be moved quickly to the marketplace to avoid deterioration, leaving 
sellers unable to store the product awaiting favourable market conditions, which 
means that transactions occur frequently. Perishability adds to the complexity of a 
transaction because the quality of the product can deteriorate, thus imposing 
sorting or information costs on buyers and also increases negotiation costs as 
procedures are required for establishing which party (buyer or seller) is responsible 
for product quality at different stages of the transaction5. 
2.3.2 Alternative governance structures 
The transaction characteristics thus have a major influence on the efficiency of 
alternative transaction modes. According to Loader (1997) citing Hakansson, the 
notion of rationalizing and economizing on transaction costs in the comparison of 
different modes of organisation becomes crucial and implies that the level of 
transaction costs will differ considerably depending on which contractual 
perspective is taken (i.e. looking from either the seller's or buyer's point of view). 
Loader (1997) gives a summary of the implied contracting process with respect to 
the characteristics of the transaction and suggests that: 
i. "If full rational judgement is assumed but inputs are dedicated6 and other 
parties are opportunistic, then the contractual world becomes one of 
planning, where all the relevant issues of contract are settled at the contract 
design stage, and the contract is accurate and effective because 
participants are fully rational and informed as to the potential behaviour of 
other parties. 
5 For examples and discussion of the effects on product spoilage of different contractual 
relationships see Lang (1980). 
6 Dedicated inputs/ assets: relation of dependence between investment and return in face of the 
dedication to a particular agent of specific activity. See also Masuku (2003). 
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ii. If opportunism is absent, but economic agents are subject to limits to their 
judgement (through lack of information) and require assets which are 
dedicated to the particular exchange, then simple promises suffice to strike 
bargains (the trader's word is his bond). 
iii. Where limited judgement and opportunistic self-interest are present, but 
inputs can be freely moved between uses, the world of competition prevails, 
where the market arbitrates any disputes and informational inadequacies, 
and the parties to the transaction have no long-term interest in the identity 
of, or the relationship with each other''. 
However, when conditions of limited judgement, opportunistic behaviour and 
dedicated inputs occur simultaneously, planning is incomplete, promise breaks 
down, and competition does not persist because of dedicated inputs, this becomes 
the world of internal governance. 
In supply chain management, governance or the coordinating system is important. 
According to the AgriReview (2002), alternative governance systems may include 
open-access markets, various forms of contracts, strategic alliances7, quasi-vertical 
integration Uoint ventures, franchising arrangements, networks and cooperatives )8 , 
and vertical ownership. The choice of governance or coordination system will have 
a significant impact on the distribution of power and control. In figure 2.2 below, the 
vertical coordination continuum is presented 
7 A strategic alliance is an agreement mutually entered into by two independent firms to serve a 
common strategic objective. lt is often more flexible than a contract or full vertical integration and 
central to its success is trust between firms and a strategy which is to the mutual benefit of all the 
participants; sometimes the alliance may place a legal obligation on the parties (Hobbs, 1996; 19). 
For example, a fruit exporter might reach an agreement with a group of farmers to obtain fruit of 
certain quality, providing the farmers with a list of acceptable varieties . A fruit exporter might also 
enter into a strategic alliance with the retailer under a strategic alliance. 
8 Quasi-vertical integration refers to a relationship between buyers and sellers that involves a long-
term contractual obligation where both parties invest resources in the relationship. lt differs from full 
vertical integration because the arrangement ceases at the end of an agreed period of time and the 
firms remain independent of one another. Joint ventures, franchises and licences are examples of 
quasi-vertical integration (Hobbs, 1996; 19). 
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Figure 2.2: Alternative governance structures for managing produce 
marketing 
Vertical 
In the figure 2.2 above the spot market and vertical integration are presented at 
extremes of the coordination continuum. In the spot market, the open market ideal 
of the invisible hand coordinates market transactions where individuals are 
assumed to act only in self-interest and pursue exchange agreements that are 
short-term, opportunistic, limited in information sharing, flexible and preserve 
independence. On the other end of the continuum coordination is managed on the 
basis of mutual interest for the exchange partners, who pursue exchange 
agreements that are long-term, benefit sharing, open as to information flow, stable, 
and supportive of interdependence. In between the two polar ends, coordination 
evolves from being dominated by invisible hand characteristics through a changing 
mix of invisible hand or managed characteristics to being dominated by managed 
characteristics. 
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2.3.3 Efficient governance 
According to Loader (1997), for efficient governance in the agro-food sector, three 
main structures emerge, with reference to the volume or number of transactions 
and the characteristics of the investment required to consummate them. Table 2.4 
and Table 2.5 below represent efficient governance structures and examples of 
investment characteristics and efficient governance respectively. 
Table 2.4: Efficient governance structures 
Nature of transaction 
Standardised (occasional or 
recurrent) 
Occasional non-standardised 
Recurring non-standardised 
Notes: 
Type of contracting 
Classical contracting 
Neoclassical contracting 
Relational contractingc 
Expected 
governance structure 
Marketa 
Trilateralb 
Bilateral/ unified 
a Alternatives are available (from the market) which can be used if dishonesty occurs 
b Contracts are built with safeguards and identified arbitration (neoclassical contract 
laws) 
c Continuing contract between the parties where a range of social and economic 
relationships help to define and support a range of transactions 
Source: Loader (1997; 26) adapted from Williamson (1985) 
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Table 2.5: Examples of investment characteristics and efficient governance 
Non-dedicated Input characteristics Mixed Dedicated 
Market (Classical Trilateral (neoclassical) Trilateral (neoclassical) or 
contracting) e.g. e.g. purchasing unified governance, e.g. 
purchasinga customized equipmenta constructing a planta 
Market (classical Bilateral governance Unified governance 
contracting) e.g. (relational contracting) e.g. (relational contracting), 
purchasing standard purchasing customized e.g. site-specific transfer 
materialb materialb of intermediate product 
across successive rangesb 
Notes: 
Volume or number of transactions= afew; bmany 
Source: Loader (1997; 27) adapted from Williamson (1985) 
In both the tables presented above, market governance implies that alternatives 
are available which protect each party against opportunistic self-interest by the 
opposing party to the contract; trilateral governance implies arbitration in resolving 
disputes and evaluating performance; bilateral governance implies continuing 
contractual contact, but with the autonomy of the parties maintained; and unified 
governance implies internalisation of the contracting process. 
2.4 RESEARCH ON TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
The New Institutional Economics under which the transaction cost economics 
paradigm branch falls is relatively new and as such the great advancements in 
theory that have been achieved have not been matched by empirical evidence to 
establish the effectiveness of the TCE approach to supply chain management. This 
is perhaps not surprising, since, unlike production costs, transaction costs - the 
costs of economic organisation - are neither easy to separate from other 
managerial costs nor readily measurable. Despite this shortcoming a number of 
studies can be pointed out especially in the developed countries, that have aimed 
at using TCE to improve supply chain management. This section reviews some 
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empirical studies on transaction cost and supply management in the agricultural 
sector. lt provides an overview of studies at the global level and then closes with 
some studies focusing on Southern Africa. 
2.4.1 Global studies 
Hobbs (1996a) notes that the complex nature of firms and market institutions 
means that the costs of their operation are not easy to quantify and the data which 
one might use to measure transaction are not usually collected by government or 
by the standard accountancy practices of firms. Therefore, although one can 
recognise that there are indeed costs involved in valuing a good or in monitoring 
the actions of a buyer or seller, it is difficult to measure these costs in financial 
terms. Economists have therefore, turned instead to other ways of measuring 
transaction costs. 
Sylvain Rousset (2003) in his case studies of the restructuring in regional wine 
supply from Burgundy, California and New Zealand, used a transaction cost 
analysis to study the link between raw material transaction characteristics and 
governance structures (market, hybrid, hierarchy) in the fine wine industry. 
Fieldwork was conducted in four countries, and semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key industry representatives, including wine merchants technical 
staff and new world wineries people in charge of raw material purchasing and or of 
the production on the vineyards. Other people interviewed included growers, 
vineyard development firms, labour contractors, middlemen (agents, distributors), 
professional or inter-professional organisations, administration, and extension 
service officers. The study, which is partially incomplete, has led Rousset to 
conclude by noting the relevance of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
framework to explain the structures on vinous raw materials in the wine firms and 
supply chains studied. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), Jill E. Hobbs (1996) conducted a study using a 
transaction cost analysis of the quality, traceability and animal welfare issues in 
beef retailing. In her study, the hypothesis that "a retailer's choice of beef supplier 
is influenced by the transaction costs incurred in different supply relationships" was 
investigated. The study measured the relevance of the transaction costs incurred 
39 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
by retailers as a result of concerns over quality consistency, traceability and farm 
animal welfare using conjoint analysis9. Data were collected through a postal 
survey of UK supermarket retailers and results suggest that the information and 
monitoring costs arising from the need to ensure that beef supplies are of a 
consistent quality are relatively important influences on the choice of a supplier. 
This was followed by the traceability of cattle, whether the beef originates from a 
farm assurance scheme and the price paid by the retailer. The study concludes 
that strategic alliance partnerships between retailers, processors and marketing 
groups composed of farmers may emerge as the method of vertical coordination 
which minimizes transaction costs. 
Another interesting study that was conducted by Loader and Hobbs (1998) 
analysed the likely impact of a bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis on 
the organisation of the UK beef supply chain. Using concepts from the "New 
Institutional Economics", the authors argued that, in addition to the direct financial 
costs of the crisis, additional hidden transaction costs and long-term "transaction 
benefits" should be considered. The hidden costs include, the increased need for 
monitoring and traceability in the supply chain, while hidden benefits may result 
from a reorientation of the industry towards a more consumer-driven focus, a 
greater attention to food safety issues and opportunities for branding and market 
segmentation. They suggested that hidden costs and benefits are likely to lead to 
closer vertical coordination throughout the beef supply chain. 
Carvalho et a/ (2000) conducted a survey among Brazilian exporters of apples and 
melons to determine the governance structures of the two fruit chains. Three 
research methods were used in this study; a survey of Brazilian exporters of fruit; 
semi-structured interviews with executives of key export firms; and secondary data 
analysis. The study revealed that vertical integration of the production and the 
export activities in firms is the predominant governance structure in the two export 
sub-sectors. The transactions between exporters and importers were of the market 
type, and it was also found that the counterparts in an export transaction have a 
long-term commitment to each other. This attitude gives room for ample use of 
9 Conjoint analysis method uses survey data and is potentially less resource intensive. lt involves 
ranking different scenarios in terms of preference. For more detail about the use of conjoint 
analysis, see Hair and others ( 1992); Steenkamp ( 1987). 
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supply chain management tools. 
2.4.2 Empirical Studies in Southern Africa 
In Southern Africa the concept of transaction cost analysis and chain management 
has gained popularity in the agricultural sector, as evidenced by the increase in the 
number of studies that have been and are being conducted. The importance of 
transaction cost economics in enhancing the competitiveness of the sector through 
its cost minimisation approach cannot be ignored. Several studies from Southern 
Africa that have applied transaction costs are reviewed in this section. 
Karaan (1999) used a transaction cost approach to identify an appropriate farm 
model for the mussel mariculture industry. The study was carried out in Saldanha 
Bay were small-scale mussel farming is more efficient than production by large 
vertically integrated firms. The hypothesis in the study was that "high transaction 
costs essentially constrain the participation of emerging farmers in the open 
economy". In the study four models were compared and franchising was found to 
be the most suitable model, because the efficiency advantages of small-scale 
production are retained and high transaction costs are circumvented through more 
effective vertical coordination. Other models that were proposed included 
independent small operators, contract institutions between small operators and 
processors or marketers and vertically integrated more specialized large firms. 
De Bruyn et a/ (2001) applied a non-linear dynamic model to determine the 
influence of transaction costs on the marketing decisions of cattle owners in the 
Northern communal areas of Namibia. The hypothesis that "a producer's choice 
between alternative marketing options is influenced by transaction costs was 
tested". A sample of 80 households in the Kavango, Caprivi, and North Central 
regions of Namibia were interviewed using a structured questionnaire with the 
transaction cost variables considered being divided into three main groups -
information, negotiation and monitoring or enforcement costs. The results of the 
study indicated that a number of transaction cost variables (herd size, distance 
from auction points, information and risk) have a significant effect on the proportion 
sold to the government owned parastatal Meatco and thus indirectly on the choice 
of marketing channels. 
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In Swaziland, Masuku et a/ (2003) proposed and analysed a model of relationships 
between smallholder sugarcane growers and millers in the Swaziland sugar 
industry supply chain. The aim was to identify the behavioural factors that 
contribute to the utility that sugarcane growers perceive in their relationship with 
the millers. The study used data collected in 2001 from a sample of 124 
smallholder cane growers who supply sugarcane to the three sugar cane mills in 
Swaziland. Personal interviews using a structured questionnaire were conducted 
and the results indicated that higher levels of trust lead to higher levels of 
cooperation that in turn lead to higher levels of commitment by the smallholder 
growers to the business relationship. lt also noted that cooperation is an 
antecedent of the benefits and of the satisfaction that these growers gained from 
the relationship. According to the authors these findings imply that both cane 
growers and millers need to focus on initiating, signalling and disclosing their 
behaviours in an effort to improve their relationship with each. 
Other studies that were recently conducted include the study by Meissenheimer et 
a/ (2001) on "Sources of transaction costs in the South African Wine Supply chain" 
with implications for enhancing chain competitiveness. Also Makhura (2001) used 
the transaction cost approach in his doctoral thesis on "Overcoming transaction 
cost barriers to market participation of smallholder farmers in the Northern Province 
of South Africa". 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a literature review of the importance of transaction costs 
in determining the efficiency of the firm, and its role in supply chain management. 
Most importantly, it has attempted to explain the organization of firms and 
institutions under different sets of conditions. The fruit industry, like any other 
industry in the agro-food sector, requires a greater degree of coordination and, as 
such, transaction costs should not be ignored if competitiveness of the industry is 
to be achieved. These transaction costs emanate from different sources and can 
be observable or unobservable. They generally arise from lack of information, 
contract management, transport and administrative processes. 
As conveyed in the literature, the pace at which theoretical development has 
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advanced has not been matched by empirical development of the transaction cost 
approach to chain management. Although the subject has attracted overwhelming 
attention amongst academics and business management practitioners in many 
developed nations, this has not been the case in Southern Africa, where the 
studies have been limited. 
This study attempts to add to the empirical analysis of the transaction cost 
approach to supply chain management. In subsequent chapters the empirical 
findings will be used to analyse supply chain management using the transaction 
cost approach. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CASE STUDY:- TABLE GRAPE AND CITRUS FRUIT CHAINS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The approach taken in this study, as explained in the methodology section of 
Chapter One, attempts to isolate the constituent features of transactions, 
identifying the inefficiencies that arise from these transactions. The objective is to 
identify the transaction costs that result from these inefficiencies. In the sections to 
follow, a brief overview of the value chain structures of the Table grape and Citrus 
industry is provided. This is followed by a breakdown of the activities that constitute 
the value chains. The mapping, identification of linkages, inefficiencies and 
ultimately the analysis of the transaction cost that arise, is subsequently explained. 
Of importance to note is that the transaction is taken as the unit of analysis 
(Williamson, 1996). 
3.2 MAJOR ACTIVITIES OR PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TABLE 
GRAPE INDUSTRY 
The Table grape chain of South Africa has been transforming rapidly over the 
years after deregulation. 
The importance of delineation when analysing an industry was emphasised by 
Meissenheimer et a/ (2001) in their study of the South African wine supply chain. 
In this particular study, efforts have been made to determine the primary and 
secondary activities, highlighting the linkages related to the production, 
procurement, marketing and exporting (distribution) of the table grape chain. 
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3.2.1 Primary Activities in The Table Grape Chain 
The Table grape chain is unique to other chains of the South African fruit industry 
in the manner in which operations are managed. The primary activities include 
viticultural practices, cooling and packaging. The emphasis here is to give a brief 
overview of what is involved in each. 
a) Viticu/tural practices 
This encompasses all the production preparations that can ensure optimum yields 
without compromising on quality. The climate, soil and slope type play a major role 
and determine the appropriate variety that is suitable to a particular area or region. 
Good viticultural practices and management is crucial for sustainable production 
and is also important when issues of traceability, environmental concerns and 
quality assurance are required. Such concerns in effect will channel the manner in 
which to manage production in the medium -long-term period. 
b) Packaging 
When pickers harvest fruit, it is placed in field lugs without trimming. lt is then 
placed in the shade of the vines to await transport to the shed. At the packing shed 
the field lugs are distributed to packers who select, trim, and pack the fruit. To 
facilitate quality selection each packer often packs two different grades 
simultaneously and a scale is used to facilitate packing to a precise net weight. 
Packaging of Table grapes is according to market specifications. Different markets 
require different packing specifications and this may be loose or value adding pre-
packs. The function of packaging is manifold. lt includes protection of the fruit from 
damage, and maintaining the quality and condition of the fruit. Also packaging 
promotes the cosmetic appearance of the fruit, which is crucial in marketing. The 
overall packaging has an important role in influencing the buyer's perception of 
quality. 
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c) Cooling 
The main purpose of cooling table grapes is to lower their respiration rate and 
thereby increase their life span after harvesting. Because the respiration rate 
increases exponentially with the temperature of the grapes, it is advantageous to 
lower the temperature to -0.5°C as soon as possible. From the field temperatures 
must be below 20°C as soon as possible after picking and to -0.5oc as soon as 
possible thereafter. How one achieves this reduction in temperature is dependent 
on the overall system which is being followed from packing to market which makes 
this process a crucial stage in the supply chain and hence the need for producers 
in South Africa to have their own pack-houses. 
3.2.2 Secondary and Supporting Activities in the Table Grape Chain 
The exporter is the major role player at this stage. The major role is to link the 
producer and the buyer. In generic terms, the exporter is the producer's agent. 
However, this role entails much of coordination if both parties are to be satisfied. 
The coordination activities performed by the exporter include: 
i) Crop estimates, 
ii) Inform markets, 
iii) Market requirements, 
iv) Monitoring packing, 
v) Liasing with manufacturers of packaging material, 
vi) Liasing with cold stores, 
vii) Making transport arrangements, 
viii) Making shipping arrangements and, 
ix) Communicating with the importer 
Other activities include banking, insurance and ensuring that the requirements of 
the Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) are adhered to. 
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3.3 MAJOR ACTIVITIES OR PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CITRUS FRUIT INDUSTRY 
The role of the exporter in the supply chain is crucial for enhancing the 
competitiveness of the industry. Exporters are not just shippers of produce but also 
the primary party in South Africa responsible for meeting the supply chain 
requirements set by importers. These firms need the capability to work closely with 
importers; organization to deal with growers to meet volume and quality 
requirements; capital to invest in transportation and post-harvest facilities; and 
ability to benefit from governmental incentives (Singh, 2002). 
Exporters work closely with growers from planting to harvest to ensure production 
of high quality produce and compliance with European standards of food safety 
and labour practices. They are also involved in training of farmers on safety and 
quality management issues and oversee the use of chemicals on produce grown 
for export. 
Citrus fruit are a perishable commodity, thus their freshness on the retail shelf 
depends to a great extent on how it is handled after harvest. Field heat of the 
harvested crop has to be removed as soon as possible and the surface washed 
and disinfected to prevent bacterial and fungal damage. To this end, products need 
to be placed in shade immediately after harvest, transported to packing facilities, 
cooled, washed with chlorinated water, graded, and packed under controlled 
humidity and temperature. Facilities for post-harvest handling, including pack-
houses and cold storage chambers, require considerable investment. However, 
few growers have capital or expertise to undertake post-harvest processing and 
hence specialized processors or exporters themselves assume this function. 
3.4 ANALYSIS OF THE TABLE GRAPE AND CITRUS FRUIT SUPPLY 
CHAINS BASED ON TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
In analysing the Table grape and Citrus fruit supply chains from a TCE perspective, 
the framework of analysis was adapted from the work of Loader (1997) who 
illustrated the possibility of using transaction cost economics as a basis for a 
detailed diagnostic investigation of individual relationships within an agricultural 
marketing system, and to explore the implications of such relationships for channel 
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structure and integration. 
Central to the study is the role of the exporting firm, Colors Fruit (SA) Pty Ltd, in 
managing its activities with other chain role-players (producers and importers). The 
mapping exercises of the Table grape and Citrus fruit chains was undertaken to 
facilitate the identification of linkages, hence the transactions being studied. A 
participatory approach was used and this exercise was made possible with the 
assistance of the Logistics, the Table grape and Citrus fruit business unit teams 
from Colors Fruit (SA) Pty Ltd. Figure 3.1 was used as the basis for many of the 
discussions and illustrates a generic fruit supply subsystem, emphasising the links 
and transactions being studied. The major difference between the Table grape and 
Citrus fruit supply chain is the need for an on-farm pack-house for Table grapes 
due to their high susceptibility to damage. 
Due to the complexity of transaction cost economics, no attempt was made to 
measure the nature of attributes - such as asset specificity, frequency of 
transactions and uncertainty. In this case, informants were asked the nature of 
assets, level of uncertainty and frequency of transactions between transacting 
parties. 
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Figure 3.1: Generic Fruit Supply Chain And The Transaction To Be Analysed. 
a b 
i) TRANSACTION ii) TRANSACTION 
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Four key concepts underpin this analysis as identified by Hobbs (1996a). These 
are bounded rationality, opportunism, informational asymmetry, and asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1985; 1979). The nature of the relation between transacting 
parties is affected by uncertainty or risk involved in the transaction, frequency of 
the transaction and asset specificity. These three dimensions rank transactions and 
are important parameters for the definition of efficient institutional arrangements 
aimed at minimising transaction costs. 
3.4.1 Theoretical Context of Transactions Costs in the Table Grape and 
Citrus fruit Chains 
When inquiring about transaction 'a' in figure 3.1, according to Williamson (1989) 
the organisation of transactions or governance structure affects transaction costs. 
The diversity of the institutional arrangements that conduct the transactions is 
justified by the variation of the existing attributes 10 . The real explanatory power of 
the theory, though, comes from the three dimensions or attributes that are used to 
characterise any transaction. These three variables will, according to the theory, 
determine whether transaction costs will be lowest in a market or in a hierarchy. lt 
is easiest to consider these attributes with respect to decisions about whether to 
integrate vertically. According to the variation of attributes the ideal governance 
structure is determined, varying from the spot market to vertical integration, 
passing through a mixed hybrid forms. 
Several types of specific investments can be distinguished that have an effect on 
transaction "a", namely specificity of location, time specificity, physical specificity 
and dedicated specificity. 
a. Table grape chain 
i. Specificity of location: Table grapes are highly susceptible to damage and 
sensitive to temperature fluctuations, making long distance transportation 
costly. lt demands the pack-house and or cold store to be near the farm. 
ii. Time specificity: To guarantee quality and a long life span, the grapes must 
10 Williamson (1985) classifies the attributes of the transactions as: asset specificity, frequency and 
uncertainty. For more detail refer to the Literature review in Chapter Two. 
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be harvested once they reach their point of maturity. This demands constant 
technical assistance throughout the season. 
iii. Physical specificity: This does not only relate to the agricultural production, 
but also to the industry. The necessity of investing in the physical 
infrastructure emanates from the vintage the vine plant takes before it starts 
producing. This is a specific, expensive and irreversible physical investment. 
Regarding storage and handling, the equipment used is also slightly specific 
to table grapes; therefore, the reallocation to other uses becomes costly or 
irrational. 
iv. Dedicated specificity: Because of the number of reputable exporting firms 
dominating the market, producers take most of their production to only one 
firm (size investments), leading to a relation of dependence 
b. Citrus fruit chain 
i. Time specificity: To guarantee quality and a long life span, the citrus fruits 
must be harvested once they reach a certain point of maturity. This 
demands constant monitoring. 
ii. Physical specificity: The necessity of investing in the physical infrastructure 
emanates from the perennial culture of citrus plants before onset of 
production. This is a specific, expensive and irreversible physical 
investment. 
iii. Dedicated specificity: Specialising in Citrus production leads to a relation of 
dependence between investment and return. 
According to Klein et al (1978), the employment of specific assets to the 
transaction creates a quasi-rent that is characterised by the difference between the 
return in employment of these assets in the specific transaction compared to other 
alternative employment. The quasi-rent depends on the continuity of the relation in 
which each one of the partners will have incentives to acquire any incremental 
profit resulting from this joint venture, creating the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour or hold up. As a result, a relation of dependence between the partners is 
established as the asset specificity is raised. Klein et a/ (1978) note that agents 
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must indeed secure against opportunistic behaviour. The more assets are 
subjected to appropriation, the more one goes towards an integrated structure, and 
the less the entrepreneur calls upon the market. 
Marino and Machado (2000) note that increasing the frequency of transactions 
entails the use of more complex structures and makes the creation of reputation 
possible, decreasing, consequently, the transaction costs. In the definition of 
control structure, the attribute frequency is of supreme importance as it guards 
against opportunistic behaviour in face of the potentiality of future interruption of 
the business. 
The third attribute to be considered refers to the uncertainties of the environment. 
These uncertainties provoke unexpected disturbances in the transactions, 
demanding complex structures of monitoring, which might encumber the cost of the 
transaction. With a raised degree of uncertainty, ceteris paribus, the transaction 
tends to internalise (Marino and Machado, 2000). 
TCE theory suggests that when a transaction is associated with low asset 
specificity, low uncertainty the implied contractual process is of a classical/ promise 
(i.e. word of mouth will suffice as a basis for a transaction) due to lack of specific 
inputs (Loader, 1997). In figure 3.1, transaction 'b' is expected to be conducted on 
the market (spot contract). However the need to service a specific market of 
specific interest has lead to a movement towards other hybrid forms of 
organisation . According to Wilson (1996; 1 0) the "slow growth in the overall food 
market is causing manufacturers and retailers to seek product flow strategies that 
create greater efficiencies and economies as a means of increasing their margins". 
The relation has moved strongly towards vertical coordination, as the major 
importers are increasingly demanding dedicated supply. This has provided the 
exporter with a strong client base in the export market providing their producers a 
ready market and has greatly reduced the costs of finding a buyer and price 
negotiations. Table 3.1 below summarises the relationship between asset 
specificity, uncertainty and governance structure from the arguments put forth. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the relationship between asset specificity, uncertainty 
and governance structure. 
Asset specificity 
Low for both High for both High for one party, 
parties parties low for one party 
Uncertainty High Contract/ vertical Vertical integration Vertical integration 
integration 
Low Spot market Long-term contract Vertical integration 
NB: Because frequency 1s so clear-cut, 1t 1s has been om1tted, but th1s 1s not 
because it is unimportant. On the contrary, the effect of frequency on transaction 
costs is very strong. lt is just that the case where the frequency of transactions is 
low is not very relevant. 
From the brief overview of the theoretical context highlighted above, asset 
specificity, uncertainties and frequency rank transactions, and are important 
parameters for the definition of efficient institutional arrangements that aim at 
minimising the transaction costs 
3.4.2 QUALITATIVE APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS 
Through an empirical application, this section intends to relate the theoretical 
concepts previously discussed with the inefficiencies that exist which result in 
transaction costs for the table grape and citrus value chains. The implications of 
these costs are also highlighted. The conjecture of the argument at this stage 
stems from the fact that a transaction can only be made if the gains in the 
transaction outweigh the costs associated with that particular transaction, that is, 
when a profit can be realised. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 identify the parties involved 
in transaction "a" and transaction "b" respectively as identified in Figure 3.1, the 
grounds for a transaction and some of the implications at stake. The compilation of 
the tables is the result of information gathered during discussions with key industry 
informants 11 during the multiple site visits to the exporter's operating location. 
11 For a list of the key industry informants see appendix 1 
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Table 3.2: Transacting Parties, Nature Of Transaction And The Stakes at 
Hand. 
Transacting 
Parties 
(Producer/ 
Exporter) 
Producer 
Exporter 
Transactions 
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relationship 
- Increase in 
insurance premiums 
from frequent claims 
- Liquidation 
Table 3.3: Transacting Parties, Transactions And The Stakes On Hand. 
Transacting Transactions 
Parties Offer Reward Stakes 
(Exporter/ 
Importer) 
Exporter i) Quality i) Competitive - Brand name loss 
guaranteed price 
- Compromising 
Table grapes ii) Market for relationship 
ii) Brand name Table grapes 
- Loss of market 
iii) Consistent iii) Information 
- Loss of 
supplies (market trends investment 
iv) Just in time etc.) 
deliveries iv) Income 
Importer i) Market for i) Quality Table - Supply of bad 
Table grapes grapes product 
ii) Payment ii) Brand name -Inconsistent 
iii) Competitive iii) Guaranteed supplies 
prices supplies - Reputation 
iv) Long-term iv) Just in time 
relationship deliveries 
NB: The list of stakes on hand is not exhaustive, but aims at giving an overview of 
the implications that parties can encounter when brokering a transaction . 
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Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 above highlight the importance of ensuring a smooth 
transaction between the producer/ exporter and exporter/ importer respectively, if 
sustainability is to be ensured. All parties have stakes that affect their operations, 
thus mutual agreements exist to ensure that each party carries out its end of the 
bargain. 
The tables presented in the next section comprise three parts: 
~ The first part summarises the contractual perspective putting emphasis on 
the transaction objectives of the parties involved and highlighting the 
relationship under consideration, 
~ The second summarises the transaction attributes and, 
~ Finally the governance structure, given the level of particular attributes is 
discussed. A comparison is made between the implied and actual 
governance structure. The implications of such arrangements are also 
noted. 
The tables are presented for each contractual situation between the parties 
involved to enable the exploration of the governance mechanism in the chain. 
a) Exporter and Producers 
Table 3.4 assesses the position of the exporter and producer illustrating the nature 
of the contracting process between the two. lt highlights the fact that transaction 
attributes affect the governance structures. The high specificities, frequency of 
transactions and the relative degree of uncertainty channels the contracting world 
to one not of competition but of relational and or bilateral contracting. In this world, 
close relationships are formed that ensure the establishment of long-term 
interactions. The fact that the exporter is not only involved in trade activities, but 
also in producing export fruit, implies that with such integration, the firm can make 
use of several managerial tools to guide the flow of resources. This involves 
harmonisation of production, post harvest processing and the logistics in 
international trade. This way they gain control of all operations on the export side of 
the supply chain. lt also makes harvesting to value added processing an integrated 
operation and oversight on labor laws, pesticide regulations, and safety compliance 
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easier. Growing crops on their own farms guarantees continuity of supply and 
reduces risk of losing suppliers to competition. 
Table 3.4: Exporter to Producers 
1) Contractual 
perspective 
Transaction Objective 
2) Transaction Attribute 
Asset specificity 
Frequency 
Uncertainty 
3) Governance 
Implied contracting 
process 
Expected governance 
structure 
From Exporter To Producers 
To ensure that the quality of fruit the company 
produces and handles is not compromised 
High- especially investments in human skills) to 
specifically dedicate all their attention, time and 
expertise on identifying and fulfilling the needs 
of producers and customers (e.g. quality control 
cannot easily be re-deployed. 
Also investments in pack-houses and pre-
sorting facilities. 
High - transactions conducted on a daily or weekly 
basis in-season 
Relative - Agricultural products; Climatic conditions 
affect yield, can affect harvesting schedules 
and also cause delays in loading and 
offloading. This can have ripple effects on other 
factors. Hold up problems are prevalent, 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
are common. 
Formal contract (neoclassical) 
Relational/ Bilateral contracting 
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Actual governance 
structure 
Implications 
b) Exporter to Importers 
Relational contracting 
Need for the establishment of close relationships with 
producers and ensure that they understand the global 
demands. Building of trust and long-term relationships 
is important. 
Therefore there is a tendency to move towards 
adoption of hybrid forms governance (e.g. strategic 
alliances and joint ventures). 
The role of the exporter with the importers varies depending on the target market. 
Each market has different requirements and specifications thus there is a tendency 
to have varying levels of governance structures being used. Despite this, the 
objectives of the importer play a considerable role in channelling or determining the 
governance structures to be used. In Table 3.5 a general approach has been taken 
to determine the common governance structure because of the multiple export 
markets that the exporter is servicing. In the table it can be seen that there is a 
great divergence of the expected and actual governance structures. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the exporter's transaction objective is to target a particular 
market that has a certain preference or that is very sensitive to agronomic 
practices and environmental issues. Hence, the achievement of this is captured by 
the development of a good reputation and investments in brand name marketing. 
Another important factor to note is that the bulk of the exports are destined for 
relatively few importers, making it possible to minimise the negotiation and other 
costs. In the long-term aspect, this behaviour creates the opportunity to establish 
better transaction specific arrangements. This means joint ventures aimed at value 
adding, development of new technologies, sharing information, and reducing risk 
associated with investment in specialised assets. 
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Table 3.5: Exporter to Importers 
1) Contractual 
perspective 
Transaction Objective 
2) Transaction Attribute 
Asset specificity 
Frequency 
Uncertainty 
3) Governance 
Implied contracting 
process 
Expected governance 
structure 
Actual governance 
structure 
Implications 
From Exporter To Importer 
To deal with only the world's most discerning 
(perceptive) customers 
Low- specialised refrigerated containers, loading and 
unloading facilities owned by third parties. 
High - in season, usually large quantities during 
certain periods. Usually transactions are on a 
weekly basis. Consignments reach the importer 
weekly. 
Relative - Depends on a particular market. Each 
market has specific demands - consumer 
trends; quality checks; occasional delays in 
shipping dates; quantity information and 
exchange rate fluctuations all affect the 
transaction. 
Spot contract 
Market 
Relational 
Reputation/ brand name establishment is important to 
ensure transactions with leading retailers/ importers. 
A high tendency to coordinate with the adoption of 
strategic alliances and dedicated supplies. 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
In the following sections attempts have been made to highlight the problems or 
inefficiencies that occur and or exist in the table grape and citrus fruit chains. This 
has been related to what Coase (1937) noted on the non-existence of zero costs 
during a transaction, Williamson (1985) also shared the same sentiments of the 
existence of positive transaction costs, which manifest themselves in bounded 
rationality, asset specificity, uncertainty and opportunism, emanating from the 
problems and inefficiencies that exist in the chain. Table 3.612 identifies these 
problems and or inefficiencies that generate transaction costs in the chain and their 
implication. 
Table 3.6: Transaction costs and their implications in the Table grape and 
Citrus fruit chains 
PROBLEM/ SOURCES OF IMPLICATION 
INEFFICIENCY TRANSACTION COSTS 
Over-production Opportunism • Poor quality fruit 
• Over supply 
Climatic conditions Bounded rationality • Yields are affected 
• Quality is 
compromised 
• Affect harvesting, 
packing and delivery 
schedules 
• Over-ripening of fruit 
Inappropriate varieties Opportunism and • Compromises quality 
Information asymmetry 
• Compromises 
producer/ exporter 
12 The table is the result of information gathered during discussions with key industry informants 
during the multiple site visits to the exporter's operating location. 
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relationship 
• Damages industry's 
image/ reputation 
• Perennial nature of 
vines makes re-
investment expensive 
or even impractical 
Shirking w.r.t. complying Opportunism • Industry's image is 
to technical specifications compromised 
• Quality is 
compromised 
• Compromises 
producer/ exporter 
relationship 
Weak enforcement Opportunism and • Quality is 
measures Information asymmetry compromised 
• Adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems 
Limited packaging Asset specificity and • Monopolies/ 
material suppliers Opportunism Oligopolies thrive-
high prices 
• Missing client 
deadlines - ripple 
effect on the chain 
• Quality may be 
compromised 
Private pack-houses Asset specificity (Location • High establishment 
(important to Table specific) and maintenance costs 
grapes) 
• Pose as barrier to 
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entry 
• Few alternative uses 
Specialised packing Asset specificity (physical • High prices 
material specificity) 
Delays in transport Asset specificity (time • Affects price of fruit 
deliveries to port specificity) Failure to load on • 
booked freighter 
• Storage costs at 
harbour are incurred 
• Quality is 
compromised 
• Compromises 
exporter/ importer 
relationship 
• Compromises 
exporter, producer and 
transporter relationship 
Malfunctioning Information asymmetry • Quality is 
temperature recorders and opportunism compromised 
Delays in distribution of Opportunism and Asset • Quality is affected 
packing material to specificity (time specificity) 
• Relationships are 
suppliers 
affected 
• Deadlines and 
schedules are 
compromised 
Slow flow of market Information asymmetry • Compromises 
information and Opportunism industry's 
competitiveness 
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• Decision making is 
prolonged 
• Gaps in 
communication 
Top down information Opportunism and • Development of 
dissemination Information asymmetry industry is 
compromised 
• Failure to adapt to the 
changing global 
environment due to 
lack of bilateral 
consultations 
• Producers may be 
channelled in wrong 
direction 
Fruit supply inconsistency Bounded rationality • Failure to meet 
demand 
• Relationships are 
compromised 
• Inaccurate projections 
• Efficient planning is 
compromised 
Few specialised Bounded rationality • Variation in quality 
producers 
Reliance on informal Bounded rationality • Shirking can become a 
contracting problem 
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3.5.1 Information asymmetry and supply chain management 
Competitiveness within the industry is important for the sustainability of the industry 
in the global markets and the flow of information plays an important role to ensure 
that competitiveness is achieved. This is possible when equity in information 
sharing within the industry prevails. Market signals should be distributed to all role 
players in the industry in order to prevent costs to the industry in the form of lost 
opportunities. Where information is incomplete and there is no collaboration among 
role players, the industry's development becomes vulnerable. In both the table 
grape and citrus fruit chain, opportunism by some role players who have more 
information than others can result in a benefit at the expense of others. Examples 
include;-
~ Virus contamination or a new breed of pests can affect the quality and 
yields of producers who are not informed of the outbreak or proper control 
measures. 
~ Poor scheduling of harvesting, delivery and proper communication with 
role players in the chain are results of incomplete information that are 
costly to the players and industry in general. 
~ New technology is important to keep in touch with global trends and if its 
transfer is slow, because of information asymmetry between the users of 
the technology and the researchers, huge costs are incurred making the 
industry incompetent because of use of inappropriate technology. 
3.5.2 Opportunism and supply chain management 
The lure to exploit a situation to own advantage is a common human phenomenon 
and when conducting business or transactions, an opportunity that allows firms or 
parties to act in a self-interest seeking manner to further one's objectives can be 
irresistible. Opportunism is common when transactions are made and the table 
grape chain is not an exception. This high value fruit is highly susceptible to 
damage from weather and even climatic conditions. Its perennial nature makes it a 
high-risk investment such that producers prefer to spread risk. 
Over-production per hectare is common among producers; however the 
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consequence of such actions can affect not only the producer but also the industry. 
Because this is a high value fruit, volume is not an important driver for production. 
Quality fruit ensures a good return and this is possible when managing an optimum 
crop per hectare. This enables a producer to take note of his operations without 
overlooking crucial aspects in the production process. Opportunistic behaviour 
occurs when some producers decide to produce large volumes of grapes at the 
expense of quality and then attempt to sell them as quality fruit. Such decisions 
easily compromise a producer's reputation and if this goes unnoticed the industry's 
image is at stake. Another implication is that of over-supply, which leads to excess 
fruit on the market resulting in the sale of fruit at below market prices and or 
incurring costs in search of a new market. 
Compliance with international standards with respect to quality, traceability and 
phytosanitary measures among others is important, hence it is crucial for the 
industry on the whole to monitor the operations of its producers and exporters to 
ensure that any technical specifications are adhered to. Because of the imbalance 
of the producer/ exporter ratio, it is usually impossible to monitor each and every 
producer on an individual basis thus creating a window for opportunistic behaviour 
on the part of the producer. Shirking becomes possible because of the weak 
enforcement measures that prevail. 
Packaging of fruit also plays an important role in maintaining quality, and also 
affects the perception of consumers in their judgement of quality. The need for 
packaging material calls for opportunism from manufacturers who find it difficult to 
cope with demand during peak seasons. Their limited numbers and the all year 
production of fruit keeps manufacturers in business, allowing them space to charge 
high prices and fail to meet client deadlines. Such opportunistic behaviour 
compromises the competitiveness of the industry because it does not instil 
confidence in the importers on the ability of the exporter to meet schedules. High 
costs are also incurred when finding alternative manufacturers at the last minute. 
Delays affect the price of fruit due to the common fluctuations of fruit prices in a 
particular season, thus affecting projections made, and this in turn affects the 
margins. 
Communication amongst role players is an important and crucial aspect of supply 
chain management. The flow of information enables role players to quickly respond 
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to market changes and is a necessary driver for competitiveness. However, if 
information flow is impeded, gaps in communication arise. Decision-making is 
prolonged and usually there is a failure to adapt to the changing global 
environment. When some role players who have access to information fail to 
inform their partners, there are dire consequences to the industry. For instance, 
actions of exporters who fail to correctly predict future market trends and channel 
producers in a direction with the aim of furthering their own ambitions must be 
prevented through free flow of information and consultations with all stakeholders. 
3.5.3 Asset specificity and supply chain management 
As highlighted previously, asset specificity for both the table grape and citrus fruit 
chains is in multiple forms. Asset specific investments are vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour by partners in a chain. The replacement costs of the citrus 
trees; table grape vines; pack-houses and other production related investments are 
immensely high. For instance when a variety of table grapes or citrus fruit becomes 
unpopular on the export market because of consumer trends, the producer has few 
alternatives to ensure that this investment does not become redundant. 
3.5.4 Bounded rationality and supply chain management 
Bounded rationality occurs when decisions intended to be rational but the capacity 
to identify and evaluate all alternatives is physically limited. A situation in the Table 
grape chain can arise because of the perennial nature of table grapes. With the 
evolution rate of consumer preferences, this can land a producer with the 
production of inappropriate varieties. Continual changes of Table grape varieties 
become unviable due to the high investment costs involved. The same to a great 
extent applies to the citrus fruit chain. Proper research and forecast of future 
market trends should always be undertaken to prevent the costs that are incurred 
when a fruit variety falls out of demand. 
Climatic conditions influence the yield, quality and other activities in the production 
process such as harvesting, packing and loading onto vessels. For instance on a 
windy day, it becomes very difficult to load containers on the vessel, causing 
delays and congestion at the port. Continuous rains during the harvest season can 
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easily lead to the over-ripening of fruit making it impossible to distribute such fruit 
to the intended markets. Fruit supply inconsistency is a result of unpredicted 
climatic conditions, leading to inaccurate projections of output, failure to meet 
demand and also compromising efficient planning. 
Spreading risk is a safeguard measure that is usually adopted by producers so that 
their investment is protected. This stems from the uncertainty of future trends in the 
market and one way of spreading risk is to avoid specialisation. However, this 
impacts on the overall quality of their fruit units emanating from the different 
technologies that must be used for the different investments made by the producer 
as safeguard measures. Such decisions, although rational in nature, compromise 
the producer and industry's reputation because of the variability in quality that 
arises. 
Contracting is a measure that is undertaken when uncertainty between the 
transacting parties is high. Although this is a time-consuming and costly measure, 
the use of informal contracts also has its own costs. The decision to use informal 
contracts in cost terms can be rational but paves the way for opportunism and 
shirking. Bounded rationality in such instances can pose a threat to the industry's 
development requiring other options to be established that satisfy the transacting 
parties. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This Chapter has attempted to highlight the problems and or inefficiencies that 
exist in the table grape and citrus fruit chains. These inefficiencies result in 
transaction costs that compromise the competitiveness of the industry. These 
transaction costs occur whenever there is an exchange between transacting 
parties. The link between a producer/ exporter and exporter/ importer and the 
inefficiencies that exist when these parties engage in a transaction have been 
identified and also the transaction costs that emanate from them. An empirical 
application of transaction cost economics has revealed the implications of such 
inefficiencies and or problems and the extent to which the relationships between 
role players can be compromised. Other implications include the industry's image, 
quality variation and delays that impact on the price, effectively reducing or 
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lowering the margins. The incentives and safeguards to prevent these 
inefficiencies and reduce transaction costs will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has allowed for the identification of linkages within the supply chain 
where transaction costs arise. lt has set out some issues involved in isolating 
transaction costs in a supply chain, the implications of such costs and how they 
can be assessed. The success of the methodology proposed considering the 
difficult procedure involved in the collection of data, produced a simple scheme of 
classification that can identify some of the key features of the contractual 
arrangements at different stages of the chain. The framework used accomplishes 
both a basic description of the system and a thorough investigation of the 
relationships within it. 
Because the overall objective of the study is to raise ideas or issues that can 
enhance the competitiveness of the South African fruit industry through efficient 
supply chain management practices by reducing transaction costs, the empirical 
application of the TCE theory helped demonstrate the extent to which the exporter 
has adapted to changes in the global environment. The development of 
partnerships or relational transaction arrangements between the producer/ exporter 
and exporter/ importer demonstrate the evolution of governance structures from 
the simple to more complex structures in the wake of changes in global trends. 
This growing recognition of the competitive advantage that can be gained through 
improving coordination in the supply chain is the starting point for SCM initiatives 
and these are important signals that in the long run will determine the sustainability 
and competitiveness of the industry. 
The analysis put forth suggests that the nature of the transaction attributes 
determines the governance structure to be adopted . These insights resonate with 
Williamson (1975; 1985) who addressed the trade-off between incentives and 
governance costs, and noted that "internal organisation often has attractive 
properties in that it permits parties to deal with uncertainty or complexity in an 
69 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
adaptive, sequential fashion" (Williamson, 1975; 25), and, "because a high degree 
of bilateral dependency exists in those circumstances and high powered incentives 
impair the ease with which adaptive, sequential adjustments to disturbances are 
accomplished" (Williamson, 1985; 91 ). 
4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPORTERS 
The emphasis on prioritising non-financial measures such as quality; customer 
satisfaction; on-time delivery; innovation measures, and on the attainment of 
strategic objectives indicates the uncertain environment in which the exporter is 
operating. Because the exporter acts as the middleman, the exporter wields a 
certain amount of power, with the exporter generally in possession of reasonable 
levels of timely market information while producers are normally disadvantaged in 
this regard. 
The process of constructing tables is of importance in assessing the nature of the 
chain and its relationships. The interviews conducted provided a spectrum of 
valuable raw information. The implications of the closeness of the actual 
governance structure to the efficient governance structure for the situations 
considered suggest who benefits party from the relationship. In this study the focus 
centred on the role of the exporter and if the exporter is "operating in the 
environment similar to that proposed by the theoretically efficient form of 
governance (shown by the levels of the transaction variables)" (Loader, 1997; 34), 
then the exporter can be seen to be benefiting. If the opposing side to the 
transaction (i.e. producer or importer) is also operating in the environment 
proposed, then the situation should be stable otherwise any other situation would 
raise questions of power and pressure for improvement to arise until a stable 
arrangement is established. 
Other implications to be drawn from the analysis of the tables are as follows: 
• Transactions that involve specific assets extensively are best internalised by 
firms through specialisation or integration since market competition is unlikely 
to prevail. 
• Uncertain transactions require the establishment of relationships to militate 
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against the uncertain activities of other role players, therefore, mergers may 
be desirable though this may introduce new forms of transaction costs. 
• Frequent assets are most likely to be handled by some form of governance 
(i.e. either internalised or some other hybrid form of governance). 
• If opportunism is present then some form of rules and standards needs to be 
drawn up. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to use the transaction cost economics (TCE) approach to 
show how transaction costs can be reduced in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of the South African fruit supply chain. The case study approach 
used has its own limitations but is useful in that it sheds light on how supply chain 
management within a firm is important. Because the chain does not involve a large 
number of processing businesses, where for instance physical rather than time or 
place transformations occur, the lack of focus on intra-firm relationships is not a 
particular problem. In light of the findings that have been outlined, the exporter's 
ability to adapt to global trends and demand is quite exceptional, and, this is visible 
in the exporter's ability to internalise or externalise activities in response to the 
costs and benefits that are associated with that particular activity. However, there 
is room for further improvements through the provision of incentives, penalties and 
safeguards. 
Critical issues in the supply chain management for exporters revolve around three 
key factors, namely; time, cost and product quality. 
Timing is critical to the client's needs because the certainty of the events within a 
market decreases the length of time to acquire the fruit, thus preventing the 
incurrence of extra costs from a lost window of opportunity. 
Costs increase for both the importer and exporter when timing issues are inefficient 
and when product quality is inconsistent. The key areas that contribute to the 
above issues are: 
• Cold Chain Management 
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• Packing practices 
• Packing materials 
• Sorting facilities. 
Quality of product is important to the exporter-importer relationship thus quality 
controls need to be exercised from the producer to the end customer to determine 
how and where the inconsistencies are occurring. 
The remaining section of this study discusses the three aspects that are important 
in ensuring that transaction costs are minimised, namely incentives, penalties and 
safeguards. However as a point of departure, due to time constraints, the process 
of testing solutions by an expert panel was not conducted as outlined in the 
methodology section. There is need for further research on the subject of 
transaction costs and supply chain management. An analysis focussing on all the 
key role players in the chain providing insights on how individual chains are 
constructed and managed would give a clear indication to other role players on 
how coordination and cooperation creates possibilities for reducing costs. 
4.4 INCENTIVES, PENAL TIES AND SAFEGUARDS 
4.4.1 Incentives 
The purpose of providing incentives is to minimise on opportunistic behaviour and 
thereby prevent or avoid moral hazards and adverse selection amongst role 
players. Strong incentives usually suit procurement from the market while weak 
incentives are better internalised because opportunism can be prevalent in such 
instances. Incentives in the chain should be targeted to: 
• Build trust and commitment among chain players, 
• Promote good information exchange, 
• Promote diffusion of tacit knowledge, 
• Create a collective learning process among chain players. 
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4.4.2 Penalties 
Penalties should be in place to ensure that time, cost, and product quality is not 
compromised. These penalties may be: 
• Undertakings by all parties to meet agreed key performance indicators, 
• Black-listing non performing parties and high risk parties, 
• Deferring costs to the faulty party. 
4.4.3 Safeguards 
The aim of safeguards is to ensure that risk is minimized during a transaction. In 
this case the uncertainty factor is minimized, with parties maintaining flexibility to 
renegotiate thus avoiding over binding commitments to chain players. 
4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the analysis made in this study, the conclusions made reveal how the 
exporter has gained the ability to internalise or externalise activities in response to 
the costs and benefits that are associated with that particular activity in a dynamic 
and changing global environment. This is an important aspect of supply chain 
management. However, there are potential cost savings that can be gained from 
the use of other governance structures. 
Awareness of the potential motivations for contracting is essential for 
understanding the changes that take place in an ever-changing environment. 
Contracting is one option exporters can apply because of its advantages. For 
instance a production contract specifies production practices such as inputs to be 
used, and cultural practices, among others. Thus, instead of the exporter venturing 
into full vertical integration, production contracts provide a type of quasi-integration 
whereby the exporter (contractor) gains some control over the production process 
of an upstream activity without having to take ownership of the activity in the supply 
chain. By contracting, the exporter is offered a high degree of certainty about 
quality and availability of supply. Thus, depending on the preferences of both the 
contracting parties, contracts can be advantageous to both. Also contracting will 
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likely improve access to capital that is essential in any business activity. 
Based on this analysis, bilateral contracting and strategic alliances should be given 
priority to enhance effective communication, commitment and collective decision-
making. lt should also be emphasised that the key to success dwells on how the 
supply chain is managed, and a better way of achieving this is through analysing 
mistakes, past trends and learning from other competitive countries management 
processes. 
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